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Legislative Expansion of Judicial Bifurcation: 
North Carolina’s Double-Edge Sword 
KIP NELSON 
While the portrait of a trial has traditionally been painted as a single 
proceeding that determines all of the relevant issues, bifurcated proceedings 
are those in which some issues or claims are separated.  Federal and state 
courts generally have the authority to bifurcate proceedings in their 
discretion.  The North Carolina General Assembly, however, recently passed 
a law that limits a judge’s discretion and institutes a presumption in favor of 
bifurcation.  This statute is the first of its kind in the country and is a 
significant change in trial procedure.  Other states are already considering 
similar legislative reforms.  The issue rekindles important policy questions 
including the role of legislatures in governing judicial proceedings and the 
leveraging power of corporate defendants.  This Article discusses the 
implications of such legislative reform and concludes that more research is 
necessary to determine the value of bifurcation.  Using North Carolina state 
and federal cases as an example, as well as a discussion of the practical and 
policy consequences of bifurcated proceedings, the Article argues that 
bifurcation decisions should be placed within the trial court’s discretion 
rather than with the legislature. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The process is inherently so absurd, so at variance with the procedure 
followed in investigations in every other department of life, that only our 
lifelong inurement to it makes it possible for us to accept it without 
question.1 
 
 1. Lewis Mayers, The Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 
389, 389 (1938). 
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Professor Lewis Mayers, the author of the above quotation, was not 
talking about obtaining a judicial clerkship or deciding which law school 
to attend.  Professor Mayers was talking about the practice of trying the 
issues of liability and damages simultaneously, in one judicial 
proceeding.  The traditional concept of a trial, at least in the civil 
context, consists of one proceeding in which the jury determines 
whether the defendant is liable and, if so, the amount of money to which 
the plaintiff is entitled.  However, the modern trend is moving away 
from a unitary proceeding and instead moving toward dividing a trial 
into two components, a procedure referred to as bifurcation.2  More 
generally, something is bifurcated when it is “[f]orked or divided into 
two parts or branches, as the . . . tongues of snakes.”3  It is that 
procedure for which Professor Mayers was advocating in the context of 
civil jury trials. 
While historically the civil trial did consist of one proceeding, 
recent decades have seen an increasing trend in bifurcation.  In 
bifurcated proceedings, judges separate out certain issues or claims, 
purportedly for the purpose of having a more manageable trial.4  The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5 and almost every state6 permit a trial 
judge to bifurcate proceedings in his or her discretion.7  However, state 
legislatures (largely as a result of influential corporate lobbyists) are 
seeing increasing requests to enact legislation that allows for more 
bifurcated proceedings.  The North Carolina General Assembly recently 
expedited this trend by creating a statutory presumption in favor of 
bifurcation.8  Under this law, passed as part of a medical liability reform 
 
 2. Meiring de Villiers, A Legal and Policy Analysis of Bifurcated Litigation, 2000 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 153, 155. 
 3. AMERICAN HERITAGE SCIENCE DICTIONARY 68 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2005). 
 4. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 83 (2007). 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (“For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and 
economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, 
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”). 
 6. Most states have provisions in their rules of civil procedure that model the 
federal rule, although the actual language varies widely.  See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 42(b) 
(“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials 
will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number 
of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues . . . .”); 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1006 (2008) (“An action may be severed . . . as an aid to convenience, 
whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.”). 
 7. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 83. 
 8. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, sec. 2, § 1A-1, Rule 42(b), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 
1712, 1713. 
2
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statute, a judge is instructed to separate the issue of liability from the 
issue of damages unless the opposing party can show good cause for a 
unitary proceeding.9  This standard is one-of-a-kind in statutory law and 
actually contradicts much of what other courts and theorists have said 
regarding the propriety of bifurcation. 
The benefit of such a legislative mandate remains to be seen.  The 
intent of this Article is to ask whether such a drastic change was 
properly researched or will ultimately prove helpful—for judges, 
plaintiffs, or defendants.  A statutory provision in favor of bifurcation 
seems to accept the argument that “juries are simply incapable, 
statistically, of following instructions and that the time-tested method of 
submitting all the evidence to one jury in a personal injury suit should 
be abandoned.”10  Those calling for legislative reform, including those in 
the North Carolina General Assembly, have not provided any support 
for this argument, and other states would do well to analyze whether 
this argument has merit. 
To that end, this Article discusses the role of bifurcation in modern 
jurisprudence, with North Carolina serving as a self-proclaimed 
laboratory.  Part II presents a brief history of bifurcation, its role in 
criminal and civil cases, and the new law’s effect on that role.  Part III 
then compares those positions with the presence of bifurcation in federal 
proceedings.  Part IV discusses the effects of a legislative presumption in 
favor of bifurcation, ranging from evidentiary implications to policy 
justifications.  Finally, Part V provides a proposed standard to apply 
under such a statutory presumption and provides a standard for other 
state legislatures considering such a change.  In the end, the thesis 
remains the same: a statutory presumption in favor of bifurcation 
requires more research and contemplation than has been evidenced thus 
far. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIFURCATION: ONE STATE’S EXAMPLE 
Bifurcation is not a new concept in criminal or civil jurisprudence, 
but it is gaining increasing attention in both spheres.  Although the 
practice of bifurcation has been around for centuries, judges have been 
reluctant to encourage its expansion.11  In North Carolina specifically, 
bifurcation has slowly been gaining adhesion in both criminal and civil 
 
 9. See id. 
 10. Snoznik v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., No. 1:09cv42, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35308, at *3 
(W.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2009).  Notably, the court rejected that argument.  Id. at *4. 
 11. Mayers, supra note 1, at 391–93. 
3
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cases.12  North Carolina’s new law, however, takes this growth to a 
whole new level. 
A. History of Bifurcation Generally 
At common law, it was relatively common to see a two-stage trial 
for a limited number of specific types of actions.13  According to 
Professor Mayers, for example, the claim of account-render was 
traditionally separated into two portions: first, to determine whether the 
defendant had an obligation to account for a balance due and, second, to 
determine the amount that the plaintiff was owed.14  Even at that time, 
however, separate trials were not very common for most types of 
litigation.15  When Professor Mayers was writing in 1938, he found it “at 
least arguable that, without any express statutory or other authorization, 
our courts . . . have the inherent power to sever any issue for separate 
trial.”16  Still, even though some jurisdictions (including England and the 
state of New York) had statutory provisions permitting bifurcation, such 
a procedure was seldom used.17 
Thus, bifurcation, in the sense of the term as used in this Article, is 
essentially a creature of the last eighty years.  The earliest reference to 
the term “bifurcation” in twentieth-century litigation appears in two 
1928 dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court of California.18  
However, the option of separating the liability and damages portions of 
trials began to gain momentum even without the term “bifurcation.”19  
The Supreme Court of the United States eventually started using the 
 
 12. See, e.g., Roberts v. Young, 464 S.E.2d 78, 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the 
importance of bifurcation and quoting the legislative comment to Rule 42: “the power of 
severance is an indispensable safety valve to guard against the occasion where a suit of 
unmanageable size is thrust on the court”). 
 13. Mayers, supra note 1, at 391. 
 14. Id. 
 15. W.G.V., Note, Original Separate Trials on Issues of Damages and Liability, 48 VA. 
L. REV. 99, 101 (1962). 
 16. Mayers, supra note 1, at 396. 
 17. Id. at 396–98.  For additional history of the practice of bifurcation, see Judge 
Jack Weinstein’s opinion in Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 18. People v. Fook, 273 P. 779, 786 (Cal. 1928) (Preston, J., dissenting); People v. 
Troche, 273 P. 767, 774 (Cal. 1928) (Preston, J., dissenting). 
 19. See, e.g., State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No. 56 C 418, 
1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4051, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1956) (ordering the issues to be 
“separated”). 
4
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term in the 1960s.20  The term entered North Carolina jurisprudence 
shortly thereafter.21  Federal courts were given formal authority in 1966 
to “order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, 
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”22  North Carolina 
courts were given similar authority the following year.23  “The 1970s was 
marked by the continuing, if slow, growth of bifurcation decisions and 
the accelerating use of bifurcation within claims . . . .”24  Since then, 
bifurcation has become increasingly common in both criminal and civil 
cases.25 
B. Bifurcation in North Carolina Criminal Cases 
Before the 1970s, the normal practice in North Carolina was to 
establish guilt and a sentence in the same criminal trial.26  Defendants’ 
attempts to seek bifurcation were rebutted.27  In State v. Sanders, for 
example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected such an 
argument.28  At that time, North Carolina courts consistently relied on 
the one-proceeding model espoused in the sentencing statute of the 
day.29  The court also quoted the Supreme Court of the United States, 
which stated that “[t]wo-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence; 
they have never been compelled by this Court as a matter of 
 
 20. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1963) (noting that the criminal 
defendant had a bifurcated trial); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. E. Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 
84, 85 n.* (1962) (explaining that the litigation had been bifurcated into two district 
courts). 
 21. See State v. Spence, 155 S.E.2d 802, 809 (N.C. 1967) (explaining that the 
defendant had moved to bifurcate the issue of insanity from his homicide trial), vacated 
by 392 U.S. 649 (1968). 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b); see Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-773, 62 Stat. 961 
(establishing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 23. Act of June 27, 1967, No. 954, sec. 1, § 1A-1, Rule 42(b), 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 
1274, 1317. 
 24. Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects 
of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297, 304. 
 25. See, e.g., Marshall v. Williams, 574 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming 
the trial court’s decision to bifurcate a civil case, sua sponte, “for the purpose of judicial 
economy, for the ease of understandability and presentation to the jury, and again after 
lengthy consideration of the best presentation of this matter”). 
 26. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 174 S.E.2d 487, 492 (N.C. 1970) (“This Court has 
consistently upheld the single-verdict procedure established by this statute.”), rev’d on 
other grounds, 403 U.S. 948 (1971). 
 27. See id. at 493. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 492. 
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constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure.”30  Although 
the defendant in Sanders was hopeful that the federal Supreme Court 
would change that practice, the state court ruled otherwise: “we do not 
think we should anticipate that that Court will declare unconstitutional 
a practice approved in many states, including our own, for so many 
years.”31 
By statute, however, a criminal trial must now be bifurcated 
whenever the State of North Carolina seeks the death penalty.32  This 
requirement for bifurcation was added to the state statutes in 1977.33  
Since that time, a jury must first determine whether a defendant in a 
death penalty case is guilty and then, if it so finds, determine whether 
the defendant should receive a sentence of death or life in prison.34  
Until the recent tort reform legislation, this law was the only one in the 
State that explicitly encouraged bifurcation.35 
In the separate sentencing hearing in capital cases, there is no 
requirement to resubmit evidence from the guilt portion of the trial.36  
By statute, all previous evidence is permissible for the jury to consider in 
determining punishment.37  Furthermore, a court has permission to 
receive any evidence deemed to have probative value.38  Thus, a 
defendant is not entitled to a different jury in the sentencing 
proceeding.39  Instead, the evidence received at the sentencing hearing is 
cumulative and added upon the evidence previously received in the guilt 
phase.40 
Bifurcated criminal proceedings are not limited to cases of first-
degree murder, however.  In any felony trial, a judge may decide that a 
separate sentencing proceeding is necessary.41  Furthermore, the statute 
on habitual felons requires a jury first to determine whether the 
 
 30. Id. at 492–93 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967)). 
 31. Id. at 493. 
 32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2013). 
 33. Act of May 19, 1977, No. 406, sec. 2, § 15A-2000(a), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407, 
407. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000. 
 36. Id. § 15A-2000(a)(3). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 283 S.E.2d 761, 769 (N.C. 1981) (“Under Article 100 of 
Chapter 15A of the General Statutes of North Carolina, it is intended that the same jury 
should hear both phases of the trial unless the original jury is ‘unable to reconvene.’”). 
 40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3). 
 41. Id. § 15A-1340.16(a1). 
6
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defendant committed a felony and second to determine if he is a habitual 
felon.42  In cases of impaired driving, a jury first determines whether the 
statute has been violated, and the judge then determines the appropriate 
sentence.43  Bifurcation between defendants may also be used to protect a 
defendant from being prejudiced by the introduction of evidence that is 
only relevant to a co-defendant.44  Bifurcated trials are permitted in other 
situations as well, and the decision is generally within the trial court’s 
discretion.45  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently recognized a “long-
standing principle that when a statute is silent on whether to bifurcate, 
trial judges have the inherent authority and discretion to manage 
proceedings before them.”46  Notably, the court did not cite to any 
authority for this “long-standing principle.”47  In State v. Ward, the 
defendant was convicted of several felonies, including first-degree 
murder.48  After remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a 
new sentencing proceeding, the defendant sought to bifurcate the 
determination of mental retardation from the capital sentencing 
hearing.49  The trial court denied his motion, which the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina affirmed.50  Because the statute neither required nor 
prohibited bifurcation, the decision was within the trial court’s 
discretion.51  Using the same rationale, the court had previously decided 
that bifurcation was not required between proceedings to determine 
insanity and proceedings to determine guilt.52 
The Ward Court did note, however, that “[t]he evidence presented 
to the jury on these questions may overlap somewhat.”53  At the same 
 
 42. Id. § 14-7.5. 
 43. Id. § 20-138.1(d); see also United States v. Kendrick, 636 F. Supp. 189, 190 
(E.D.N.C. 1986) (describing the “bifurcated procedure”). 
 44. See, e.g., State v. Tirado, 599 S.E.2d 515, 537 (N.C. 2004) (noting that the trial 
court bifurcated sentencing proceedings to admit a co-defendant’s statement without 
prejudicing the other defendant). 
 45. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 681 S.E.2d 271, 272 (N.C. 2009) (discussing a bifurcated 
trial on charges of second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon). 
 46. State v. Ward, 694 S.E.2d 729, 730 (N.C. 2010). 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 730, 735. 
 51. Id. at 735. 
 52. State v. Huff, 381 S.E.2d 635, 678 (N.C. 1989); State v. Helms, 201 S.E.2d 850, 
853 (N.C. 1974). 
 53. Ward, 694 S.E.2d at 732. 
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time, the court opined that the evidence would likely be significantly 
different.54  Even though the statute permits a court to consider a wide 
range of evidence,55 the ordinary rules of evidence generally apply in the 
sentencing proceeding.56  The court did not discuss further the 
evidentiary issues associated with bifurcation. 
The purposes of bifurcation in the criminal context have not been 
always been clear.  Apparently, the bifurcated approach is for the 
defendant’s benefit.57  According to the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, because “the determination of guilt is entirely divorced from 
the imposition of punishment,” “the nature of the bifurcated trial itself 
serves to prevent the issue of probable punishment from bleeding over 
into the determination of guilt or innocence.”58  Alternatively, it has been 
stated that “[t]he purpose of bifurcating the trial is to avoid prejudice to 
the defendant and confusion of the jury during the proceeding on the 
principal offense.”59  Even defense attorneys may be confused about the 
purpose of bifurcation, as one attorney remarked after being asked why a 
capital proceeding is bifurcated, “God only knows.”60 
In a bifurcation setting, the two proceedings are intended to be 
distinct and separate.61  However, an allusion to the second proceeding 
during the first proceeding is not strictly prohibited.  In State v. Gibbs, 
for example, the prosecutor made comments during voir dire alluding to 
the penalty phase that, the defendant argued, implied the penalty phase 
would be reached.62  Rather than finding the comments prejudicial, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the prosecutor’s comments 
“simply refer[red] to the conditional nature of bifurcated capital 
prosecutions.”63  Similarly, prosecutors are permitted to ask potential 
jurors about their views on the death penalty.64  The Supreme Court of 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (2013). 
 56. State v. Cherry, 257 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. 1979) (“The language of this statute 
does not alter the usual rules of evidence or impair the trial judge’s power to rule on the 
[a]dmissibility of evidence.”). 
 57. See State v. Barfield, 259 S.E.2d 510, 541–42 (N.C. 1979). 
 58. Id. 
 59. State v. Holmes, No. COA08-646, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 218, at *5 (N.C. Ct. 
App. Mar. 3, 2009). 
 60. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 707 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61. See State v. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d 321, 342–43 (N.C. 1993). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 342; see also State v. Prevatte, 570 S.E.2d 440, 467–68 (N.C. 2002) (relying 
on Gibbs). 
 64. See State v. Hinson, 311 S.E.2d 256, 260–61 (N.C. 1984). 
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North Carolina has repeatedly rejected the argument that a bifurcated 
trial in death penalty cases results in a jury that is improperly inclined to 
find guilt.65  Thus, a trial court’s preliminary comments on the nature of 
a bifurcated trial does not “precipitate[] a rush to judgment by the 
jury.”66 
Absent a statutory mandate, a defendant is not entitled to 
bifurcation of the sentencing proceeding.67  The decision to bifurcate any 
issue, crime, or defendant is left to the trial court’s discretion.68  Except 
in very narrow circumstances, North Carolina has left that decision to 
the trial judges who are closest to the proceedings. 
North Carolina is, of course, not the only state to bifurcate 
proceedings in criminal trials.69  The Supreme Court blessed, and 
actually encouraged, bifurcated proceedings to satisfy the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.70  In theory, the two 
proceedings are treated as “separate universes, governed by very different 
rules.”71  But some continue to question the viability of a bifurcated 
system in which the same jury determines both the conviction and the 
sentencing.72 
For purposes of this Article, four points are important to remember 
from the criminal context.  First, bifurcation makes voir dire trickier.  
Second, a defendant is ordinarily not entitled to bifurcation.  Third, a 
strict division between the proceedings is not always maintained.  
 
 65. Id. 
 66. State v. Price, 272 S.E.2d 103, 115 (N.C. 1980). 
 67. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 681 S.E.2d 271, 272 (N.C. 2009) (discussing a bifurcated 
trial on charges of second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon); see also 
State v. Tirado, 599 S.E.2d 515, 537 (N.C. 2004) (noting that the trial court bifurcated 
sentencing proceedings to admit a co-defendant’s statement without prejudicing the 
other defendant). 
 68. Wallace v. Evans, 298 S.E.2d 193, 196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (“Whether . . . there 
should be severance rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.”). 
 69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2011) (prescribing bifurcation in cases of capital 
felonies). 
 70. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (explaining that constitutional 
concerns “are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the 
sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence 
and provided with standards to guide its use of the information”). 
 71. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital 
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1968 (2005). 
 72. See, e.g., id. at 1972 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment should apply with equal 
force to both phases of the trial); Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital 
Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 771–72 (2006) 
(arguing that a different jury should hear the sentencing phase). 
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Fourth, the value of bifurcation is still unclear.  All four of those points 
have salient applicability in the civil arena as well. 
C. Bifurcation in North Carolina Civil Cases 
Bifurcation is not limited to the criminal context; it also applies in 
civil litigation.  Given the trial judge’s broad authority to separate issues 
or claims,73 bifurcation is permissible in many different facets.  For 
example, since 1995 North Carolina has permitted a defendant to seek 
bifurcation of compensatory damages from a determination regarding 
punitive damages.74  Under statute, “[e]vidence relating solely to 
punitive damages shall not be admissible until the trier of fact has 
determined that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and 
has determined the amount of compensatory damages.”75  What was 
once considered a negative76 is now mandated by statute. 
Bifurcation is also permitted without specific statutory authority, 
and a few examples will suffice to demonstrate the breadth of the 
resultant possibilities.  In Lewis v. Purcell, the trial court granted the 
defendants’ motion to bifurcate proceedings to determine a disputed 
property line and then, if necessary, to adjudicate separately the 
plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful timber cutting.77  Because the plaintiffs 
failed to establish the property line as alleged, there was no need to 
address the second proceeding or its attendant evidentiary questions.78  
In McArtan v. Barnum, the trial court bifurcated the case first to 
determine whether a partnership existed and second to determine the 
claims and damages.79  In Daugherty v. Cherry Hospital, the case was 
bifurcated to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plaintiff’s 
claims were time barred.80  In another case, the trial court granted a 
motion to bifurcate a case between claims of negligence and breach of 
 
 73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (2013). 
 74. Id. § 1D-30. 
 75. Id.; see also Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. 2004) (analyzing the 
punitive damages statute after bifurcated proceedings in the trial court). 
 76. See Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.E.2d 443, 448 (N.C. 1979) 
(explaining previous rulings on appealability because “[n]ot to have permitted an 
immediate appeal might have resulted in a bifurcated trial in which one proceeding 
would have been directed toward compensatory and another toward punitive damages”). 
 77. Lewis v. Purcell, No. COA09-670, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 963, at *2 (N.C. Ct. 
App. June 15, 2010). 
 78. See id. at *10–11. 
 79. McArtan v. Barnum, No. COA02-1352, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1251, at *2 (N.C. 
Ct. App. July 1, 2003). 
 80. Daugherty v. Cherry Hospital, 670 S.E.2d 915, 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
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contract on the one hand and a contractual provision that purportedly 
limited damages on the other.81  In Vernon v. Cuomo, the North Carolina 
Business Court bifurcated the trial to first determine liability and then to 
determine the value of the disputed shares.82  More recently, the Court 
of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed a trial court’s decision to separate 
a plaintiff’s product liability claims from a claim for unfair or deceptive 
trade practices.83 
Bifurcation may also result from an agreement between the parties.  
The parties in Kraft v. Town of Mt. Olive, a quiet title action, agreed to a 
bifurcated trial to determine first whether the plaintiff was entitled to 
quiet title and second whether the defendant-town had acquired a 
prescriptive easement over the property.84  In another case, the parties 
agreed to bifurcate the proceedings to determine the enforceability of a 
covenant not to compete first, and then to determine separately the 
issues of breach and damages.85  Of course, such an agreement still 
requires the trial court’s blessing. 
Additionally, courts have encouraged bifurcation in other settings.  
In a legal malpractice case, it was proper for the trial court to bifurcate 
the proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff had a valid claim 
against the purported tortfeasor before determining whether the 
attorneys were negligent.86  In such situations, in which the plaintiff 
must prove “a case within a case,” the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina found that “the trying of both cases at once would likely have 
prejudiced the present defendants in defending themselves.”87  
Furthermore, that court has held that where an insurance carrier is 
defending a case as an unnamed defendant, trial of the coverage issues 
should be bifurcated.88  In all of these cases, the parties either agreed to 
the bifurcation or the trial court, exercising its discretion, found that 
bifurcation would be beneficial and expeditious. 
 
 81. Blaylock Grading Co. v. Smith, 658 S.E.2d 680, 681–82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 82. Vernon v. Cuomo, No. 06CVS8416, 2010 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 15, 2010). 
 83. Muteff v. Invacare Corp., 721 S.E.2d 379, 381–82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 84. Kraft v. Town of Mt. Olive, 645 S.E.2d 132, 134 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 85. Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912, 914 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1994). 
 86. Kearns v. Horsley, 552 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 87. Id. at 7. 
 88. Church v. Allstate Ins. Co., 547 S.E.2d 458, 462 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
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A judge has had, until recently, the authority to bifurcate 
proceedings sua sponte.89  In Marshall v. Williams, although the plaintiffs 
objected to the bifurcation, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
upheld the trial court’s decision to bifurcate without a motion from a 
party.90  Furthermore, the defendants stipulated that the plaintiff’s injury 
was a direct result of the accident, so the plaintiffs were not denied any 
opportunity to present evidence on an essential element of their claim.91  
Under the compensatory-punitive damages bifurcation, however, a 
motion is required.92  Without a motion, evidence regarding the second 
issue (which would otherwise be separated) is admissible at any time 
during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.93  Under the new law, a motion is also 
required to bifurcate the liability and damages issues.94 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina also approved a bifurcated 
trial in In re Will of Hester.95  Hester concerned three purported wills of a 
testator.96  After the propounders submitted the last of the three wills for 
probate, a jury determined that the testator lacked sufficient mental 
capacity to execute that will.97  In a subsequent proceeding, the jury 
determined that the second of the three wills was valid.98  The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina approved of the bifurcated approach, as the 
decision was within the trial court’s discretion.99  The question to ask is 
“whether separation of the issues furthers convenience and avoids 
prejudice.”100  According to the court, “[b]ifurcation was the most 
reasonable and sensible approach under the circumstances.”101 
 
 89. See, e.g., Jay Grp., Ltd. v. Glasgow, 534 S.E.2d 233, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(explaining that “[t]he trial court, ex mero motu, ordered that the issues of liability and 
damages be bifurcated into separate trials before the same jury”). 
 90. Marshall v. Williams, 574 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Ward v. Beaton, 539 S.E.2d 30, 36 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he defendant is not 
entitled to bifurcation until the defendant files such a motion.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (2013). 
 95. In re Will of Hester, 360 S.E.2d 801, 802 (N.C. 1987). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 803. 
 98. Id. at 803–04. 
 99. Id. at 804. 
 100. Id. at 804–05. 
 101. Id. at 805; see also Kirkman v. Wilson, 390 S.E.2d 698, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) 
(noting that the trial court “ordered a bifurcated trial because there were numerous 
issues in controversy”), vacated by 401 S.E.2d 359 (N.C. 1991). 
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Bifurcation is also applicable to cases involving termination of 
parental rights.  Those cases involve a two-part process: an adjudicatory 
phase and a dispositional phase.102  The first phase asks whether there is 
an adequate basis to terminate parental rights, and the second phase 
determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.103  
However, “so long as the court applies the different evidentiary standards 
at each of the two stages, there is no requirement that the stages be 
conducted at two separate hearings.”104 
The different evidentiary standards in those two phases may be easy 
to state but difficult to apply.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina has established a presumption that a judge is adequately 
equipped to determine whether grounds for termination exist before 
proceeding to consider evidence regarding the best interest of the 
child.105  The empirical question of whether this presumption has a basis 
in fact has not been answered.  Claims from parents alleging that 
improper evidence was received during the first proceeding are cursorily 
dismissed.106  Thus, North Carolina relies on its trial court judges to 
separate evidence between the two phases, regardless of the difficulty in 
a particular case. 
But North Carolina’s new law affects bifurcation in a more limited 
sense of separating the issue of liability from the issue of damages.  
Thus, this Article is chiefly concerned with bifurcation between 
proceedings involving the same parties.  Trials may be divided in other 
situations, such as severing claims or severing some of the parties.107  
Although there are related evidentiary issues in those situations, the 
scope of this new law is limited to bifurcation in the sense of two 
 
 102. In re P.C.H., No. COA10-148, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1127, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. 
July 6, 2010). 
 103. Id. at *5–6. 
 104. In re Shepard, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 105. In re White, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986). 
 106. See, e.g., In re Z.H., No. COA09-1570, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 655, at *12–13 
(N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2010) (rejecting a father’s claim that the trial court “heard almost 
exclusively best interest evidence” during the initial adjudication phase); In re J.N., No. 
COA09-1239, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 417, at *5–7 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2010) 
(rejecting a mother’s claim that the trial court improperly considered her child’s 
demeanor during initial adjudication phase). 
 107. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(1) (2013) (allowing for separate 
trials “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice”); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. 
State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 375 (N.C. 2004) (accepting the trial court’s bifurcation of trials 
between “rural school district plaintiffs” and “large urban school district plaintiff-
intervenors”); Braddy v. Nationwide Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 470 S.E.2d 820, 822 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1996) (discussing the trial court’s decision to bifurcate some claims). 
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different proceedings involving identical parties.108  In other words, this 
statutory provision concerns the decision “to sever issues within a single 
trial or proceeding for separate submission to the same jury.”109 
Before this law was passed, courts still had the authority to bifurcate 
the liability and damages portions of a trial.  In Blackwood v. Cates, for 
example, the parties agreed to bifurcate the trial to determine liability 
first and then to determine damages.110  In Rushing v. Aldridge, a referee 
bifurcated the damages issues in an adverse possession trial.111  Again, 
the decision was left to the trial court’s discretion.112  Even before the 
passage of the law, courts have had “broad discretionary authority to 
determine when bifurcation is appropriate.”113  Thus, courts would 
occasionally bifurcate the liability and damages issues.114  The difference 
was that the decision was based upon an examination of the specific 
facts and circumstances rather than a statutory mandate.  Similarly, 
courts have long had the authority to grant summary judgment on the 
issue of liability even if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
amount of damages.115 
In Land v. Land, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to 
bifurcate the liability and damages portions of the trial.116  A jury found 
against the defendants on the liability issues, and the defendants then 
sought to appeal.117  The Court of Appeals of North Carolina dismissed 
the appeal as interlocutory.118  However, the court also ruled that “[t]he 
issues decided at the first trial are thus separate and distinct from those 
to be decided at the second trial, and there is no possibility of a second 
jury rendering a verdict inconsistent with the verdict of the first jury.”119  
The court seemed to assume that the issues were completely separate 
 
 108. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, sec. 2, § 1A-1, Rule 42(b), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 
1712, 1713. 
 109. In re Will of Hester, 360 S.E.2d 801, 804 (N.C. 1987). 
 110. Blackwood v. Cates, 254 S.E.2d 7, 8 (N.C. 1979). 
 111. Rushing v. Aldridge, 713 S.E.2d 566, 570 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 112. Id. at 570, 576. 
 113. Roberts v. Young, 464 S.E.2d 78, 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
 114. See, e.g., Ruff v. Parex, Inc., No. 96 CVS 0059, 1999 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *2, 6 
(N.C. Super. Ct. June 17, 1999). 
 115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2013) (“A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages.”). 
 116. Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 518. 
 119. Id. at 516 (emphasis added). 
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and distinct, but it did not explain why.  The court did “acknowledge 
that there will, of necessity, be some repetition of evidence at the second 
trial to orient the second jury as to the nature of plaintiffs’ claims for 
compensatory and punitive damages,” but the court held that such 
repetition “does not mean that the same issues will be decided at the 
second trial.”120 
Other cases have similarly shown that the evidence does indeed 
overlap between the two proceedings.  In Hester, for example, even 
though the first proceeding only determined the validity of the last of 
three wills, all three of the purported wills were received into 
evidence.121  Similarly, evidence of liability and compensatory damages 
may often be the same evidence as that presented for punitive damages.  
Although “‘evidence relating solely to punitive damages shall not be 
admissible’ in the compensatory damages portion of the trial,” plaintiffs 
may introduce “the totality of their evidence during the compensatory 
damages portion of the trial to establish liability.”122 
Furthermore, some courts have recognized that the two 
proceedings are not really that “separate and distinct.”123  Thus, a court 
on remand cannot re-try a punitive damages issue without also re-trying 
the liability and compensatory damages issues.124  Instead, a court on 
remand must “start over at the beginning” to examine the liability issues 
before reaching the issue of punitive damages.125  The purpose of such a 
rule is so that the same jury can try all of the relevant issues.126  
Conversely, when a case is bifurcated between liability and damages, a 
court may permissibly re-try only the damages issue if it is “separate and 
distinct from the other issues and the new trial can be had without 
danger of complication with other matters in the case.”127 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. In re Will of Hester, 360 S.E.2d 801, 803 (N.C. 1987). 
 122. Gibbs v. Mayo, 591 S.E.2d 905, 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-30 (2003)). 
 123. See generally Fortune v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 371 S.E.2d 483, 486 (N.C. 1988) 
(discussing the standard for when a trial may be bifurcated). 
 124. See Jones v. Harrelson & Smith Contractors, LLC, 670 S.E.2d 242, 252 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2008), aff’d, 677 S.E.2d 453 (N.C. 2009). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 369, 377 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), 
rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 562 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2002). 
 127. City of Charlotte v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 407 S.E.2d 571, 582 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1991) (quoting Fortune, 371 S.E.2d at 486). 
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Because the decision to bifurcate is solely within the trial court’s 
discretion, it is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.128  But 
that is not to say that North Carolina has a general policy favoring 
bifurcation.129  While the decision to bifurcate the issues of liability and 
damages is ostensibly in the trial court’s discretion, appellate courts are 
not keen on bifurcating without substantial justification.130  In Headley v. 
Williams, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina said that “[t]he 
decision to bifurcate a trial in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice is left to the discretion of the trial court,” but it also directed 
the lower court that, on remand, “a single trial of the negligence and 
damages issues is recommended.”131  In other words, the decision is up 
to the trial court, but it had better be the right decision.132 
Moreover, litigants’ attempts to blur the line between the two 
proceedings are often rebutted.  For example, North Carolina’s statutes 
on cartways generally “contemplate a bifurcated procedure[,]” in which 
the first question is whether the petitioner has a right to a cartway and 
the second question is where the cartway should be located.133  When a 
party argued that a petitioner had failed to identify the proper location 
for the cartway in the first phase of the proceeding, the Court of Appeals 
of North Carolina quipped that the party had put “the cart before the 
horse.”134  Because of the bifurcated nature of the proceedings, such an 
argument was meritless because that issue was explicitly confined to the 
second phase of the proceeding.135 
In the civil context, the justifications for bifurcation may be a little 
different than in the criminal context.  According to the Eastern District 
of North Carolina, “simplification of discovery is the ‘major benefit’ of 
bifurcation.”136  On the other hand, one “favored purpose” of bifurcation 
is “avoiding a difficult question by first dealing with an easier, dispositive 
 
 128. Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
 129. See, e.g., Headley v. Williams, 590 S.E.2d 443, 448 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(suggesting to trial judges that a single trial is recommended in most cases). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Evans, 298 S.E.2d 193, 196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 132. See Vance Trucking Co. v. Phillips, 311 S.E.2d 318, 321 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) 
(recommending that the trial court “enter findings and conclusions that will establish the 
appropriateness of severance” because, in the appellate court’s opinion, a single trial 
“would not present a suit of unmanageable size”). 
 133. Jones v. Robbins, 660 S.E.2d 118, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 134. Id. at 121. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Novopharm Ltd. v. Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D.N.C. 1998) 
(quoting Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, 172 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.P.R. 1997)). 
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issue.”137  Another court declared that “the purpose” of bifurcation is 
“conservation of judicial resources and simplification of issues.”138  Or, 
more generally perhaps, bifurcation “is primarily a device that safeguards 
the defendant’s rights.”139 
D. North Carolina’s New Law on Bifurcation 
Trial courts’ discretionary authority was significantly changed by a 
portion of North Carolina’s Tort Reform Act140 that has heretofore 
received little attention.  The Act added a new portion to North 
Carolina’s Rules of Civil Procedure, which are codified in the General 
Statutes.141  The new provision reads: 
Upon motion of any party in an action in tort wherein the plaintiff seeks 
damages exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), the 
court shall order separate trials for the issue of liability and the issue of 
damages, unless the court for good cause shown orders a single trial.  
Evidence relating solely to compensatory damages shall not be 
admissible until the trier of fact has determined that the defendant is 
liable.  The same trier of fact that tries the issues relating to liability shall 
try the issues relating to damages.142 
The entire Act itself had a tortured history, as it was a piece of 
legislation cobbled together from previous attempts at tort reform.143  
The 2011 version was sponsored by three state senators: Tom Apodaca, 
Harry Brown, and Bob Rucho.144  The bill was ratified by both houses of 
the General Assembly only to be vetoed by Governor Beverly Perdue in 
June 2011.145  Governor Perdue maintained that she was “committed to 
passing meaningful medical malpractice reform” but that the version of 
the bill presented to her was “unbalanced.”146  The next month, however, 
 
 137. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 961 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hirst v. 
Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 138. Concept Design Elecs. & Mfg., Inc. v. Duplitronics, Inc., No. 94-1264, 1995 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 848, at *7–8 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 1995). 
 139. United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 726 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 140. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712. 
 141. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (2013). 
 142. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3). 
 143. See, e.g., S.B. 979, 2009–10 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2009) (proposing provisions 
similar to those of the Act that was enacted). 
 144. See S.B. 33, 2011–12 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2011). 
 145. See Beverly Eaves Perdue, Governor’s Objections and Veto Message (June 24, 
2011), http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/s33Veto/letter.pdf. 
 146. Id. 
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the legislature overrode the veto, and the law went into effect on 
October 1, 2011.147 
Because of other provisions in the Tort Reform Act, including a cap 
on noneconomic damages,148 the bifurcation provision received little 
attention in the media or in the General Assembly.149  One state 
representative introduced an amendment to the bill to delete the 
provision on bifurcation, but the amendment was voted down.150  The 
Senate’s version of the bill would have placed the bifurcation threshold 
at seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) and would have removed all 
judicial discretion by making bifurcation mandatory.151  Aside from these 
proposed changes, however, the provision on bifurcation was largely 
inconspicuous. 
Most commentators assume that the provision was added to benefit 
defendants, usually corporations and hospitals.152  According to the 
North Carolina Medical Society, such a bifurcated approach “[a]ddresses 
the classic jury error of confusing bad outcomes with medical 
negligence.”153  The theory behind the provision is that separating the 
issue of damages from the issue of liability will lead to more just results 
because jurors determining liability will not be swayed by sympathy for 
the plaintiff’s damages.154  The politically correct reason for the provision 
is that “everybody is more fairly treated that way.”155 
 
 147. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, sec. 11, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1717. 
 148. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.19(a) (2013).  Under the new law, noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases are generally limited to five hundred thousand 
dollars ($500,000).  See id. 
 149. See, e.g., Rob Christensen, Ex Chief Justices Battle Over Medical Malpractice, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (Feb. 15, 2011, 1:18 PM), http://projects.newsobserver.com/under_the_ 
dome/ex_chief_justices_battle_over_medical_malpractice (focusing on the cap on 
noneconomic damages). 
 150. See Sylvia Adcock, Lawmakers Tackle Comp, Continue Debate on Tort Reform, 
N.C. LAW. WKLY. (Apr. 8, 2011), http://nclawyersweekly.com/2011/04/08/lawmakers-
tackle-comp-continue-debate-on-tort-reform/. 
 151. See Comparison of Senate and House Versions of SB33, NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL 
SOCIETY, 1, http://www.ncmedsoc.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Senate-v-House-
Tort-Bills2.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2014). 
 152. See generally F. Marshall Wall & Dexter M. Campbell III, Bifurcation of Civil 
Trials in Trucking Cases, FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 2010, at 29, 29, available at 
http://www.cshlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/FTD-1002-WallCampbell.pdf 
(discussing the benefits of bifurcation for defendants in major personal injury lawsuits). 
 153. Medical Liability Reforms, NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL SOCIETY http://www. 
ncmedsoc.org/government_affairs/sb_33.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
 154. See id. 
 155. Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 823 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting the trial 
court’s rationale for bifurcation in a negligence case). 
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The language of the bifurcation provision is apparently based on the 
similar provision regarding bifurcation of compensatory and punitive 
damages, which was passed in 1995.156  This previous law has gained 
traction among other jurisdictions.  Some states have passed similar laws 
to the bifurcation provision on punitive damages,157 while other states 
have proposed bills patterning the North Carolina statute.158  Still other 
states have passed laws with different procedural aspects but similar 
policy justifications.159 
Under the current statutes, then, a future trial in North Carolina has 
the very distinct possibility of being trifurcated.  A jury would first 
determine whether the defendant is liable, then determine the amount of 
compensatory damages, and then determine the amount of punitive 
damages.  Given the percentage of cases that actually proceed to trial, it 
is far from clear that such a tripartite approach would actually serve the 
interests of judicial economy or benefit the parties as alleged.  Regardless 
of its effects, however, the new law is a significant change in civil 
procedure based on North Carolina’s limited history of bifurcation. 
III. BIFURCATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 
In federal court, the standard for bifurcation is a little more 
stringent.  Although federal courts have broad discretion to decide 
 
 156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-30 (2013).  That provision reads: 
Upon the motion of a defendant, the issues of liability for compensatory 
damages and the amount of compensatory damages, if any, shall be tried 
separately from the issues of liability for punitive damages and the amount of 
punitive damages, if any.  Evidence relating solely to punitive damages shall 
not be admissible until the trier of fact has determined that the defendant is 
liable for compensatory damages and has determined the amount of 
compensatory damages.  The same trier of fact that tried the issues relating to 
compensatory damages shall try the issues relating to punitive damages. 
Id. 
 157. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (LexisNexis 2011) (bifurcating the trial 
into two phases, one to determine compensatory damages and another to determine 
punitive damages). 
 158. See, e.g., S.B. 926, 2005 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (proposing a provision with 
virtually identical language to North Carolina’s statute). 
 159. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (2011) (“In any claim alleging punitive 
or exemplary damages, before any discovery relating thereto may be commenced and 
before any such claim may be submitted to the finder of fact, the court shall find, after a 
hearing and based upon clear and convincing evidence, that there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that there has been willful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the party 
claimed against.”). 
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whether bifurcation is appropriate,160 a moving party has the burden of 
showing that such bifurcation is merited.161  The standards for 
bifurcation in federal court are generally consistent across the country,162 
but the federal courts in North Carolina serve as a good comparison to 
the state court decisions described above. 
In Scarbro v. New Hanover County, an individual defendant sought 
to bifurcate the liability and damages issues to obtain an early 
determination on his defense of qualified immunity.163  The trial court 
denied the motion, reasoning that “once it is clear that such early 
resolution is impossible, trial is necessary, and it is assumed that ‘a single 
trial will be more expedient’ than separate trials.”164  The court accepted 
the defendant’s argument that “most or even all of the evidence” related 
to damages would be “separate and distinguishable from evidence related 
to liability.”165  But because there would be some overlap in the evidence, 
the court ruled that bifurcation was not appropriate.166  The defendant’s 
claims of prejudice were similarly outweighed by “the prejudice that 
would accrue from ‘depriving plaintiff of her legitimate right to place 
before the jury the circumstances and atmosphere of the entire cause of 
action . . . replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which 
causation is parted from the reality of the injury[.]’”167 
The defendant made a similar motion in Snoznik v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.168  
Snoznik involved a products liability action against a window 
manufacturer in which the defendant sought to bifurcate the liability and 
 
 160. Scarbro v. New Hanover Cnty., No. 7:03-CV-244-FL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
69886, at *6 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2011) (citing Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 
1440, 1443 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 161. Id. at *7 (citing F&G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387 
(M.D.N.C. 1999) (asserting incorrectly that F & G Scrolling Mouse was decided by the 
District of Maryland)). 
 162. But see Kathleen Burdette Shields & Jessica Gan Lee, The Bifurcation Divide, LAW 
360 (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.choate.com/uploads/113/doc/Shields,%20Lee%20-
%20Law360%20-%20The%20Bifurcation%20Divide.pdf (noting that “[c]ourts around 
the country have very different views as to the advisability of bifurcation in patent 
cases”). 
 163. Scarbro, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69866, at *5. 
 164. Id. at *8 (quoting F&G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387 (citing incorrectly the 
court as the District of Maryland)). 
 165. Id. at *12. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at *13 (quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Lit., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(internal alterations omitted)). 
 168. Snoznik v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., No. 1:09cv42, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35308 
(W.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2009). 
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damages issues.169  In support of its argument, the defendant cited a 
study from Harvard University which allegedly demonstrated that even 
juries that are instructed to separate evidence of liability from issues of 
damages “fail to follow such instructions.”170  Rejecting such an 
argument, the court deemed itself “well aware that the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s bar are well equipped to commission studies providing 
fodder on any number of issues.”171  The court went on to explain that 
“[t]he tradition under the seventh amendment has been, for the last 220 
years, for the same jury to determine liability and damages.  Such a 
tradition—nay a right—should not be so quickly abandoned . . . .”172  
The court further quoted a fellow federal district court: 
[D]efendants maintain that bifurcation will serve the interests of 
expedition and economy.  The Court fails to see how this can be so.  For 
example, two trials would require the Court to conduct similar voir dire 
examinations twice.  Twice as many citizens would be required to take 
the time to travel to the Court to participate in jury selection.  Standard 
preliminary and final jury instructions would also be given in both trials.  
More[o]ver, as plaintiff points out, some witnesses may have to testify at 
both trials.  The Court finds that the interests of expedition and 
economy would be served best by a single trial.173 
In essence, the court concluded it could not find that bifurcation would 
lead to greater convenience or expediency for anyone involved.174 
In F&G Scrolling Mouse, LLC v. IBM Corp., the defendant moved 
under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bifurcate a 
patent infringement case into separate liability and damages phases.175  
In rejecting that motion, the trial court explained: 
Notwithstanding the broad discretion conferred by Rule 42(b), the 
bifurcation of issues and the separate trial of them is not the usual course 
of events.  Nothing else appearing, a single trial will be more expedient 
 
 169. See id. at *1. 
 170. Id. at *3. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at *3–4. 
 173. Id. at *6–7 (quoting Lokai v. Mac Tools, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-00925, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 40765, at *17–18 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2007)). 
 174. See id. at *6–8; see also Layman v. Alexander, 343 F. Supp. 2d 483, 495 
(W.D.N.C. 2004) (denying the defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial into liability and 
damages phases because “one trial will serve the convenience of the parties and the 
Court, will not prejudice either the Plaintiff or the Defendants, and will minimize 
expenses and delays to each party”). 
 175. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 386 (M.D.N.C. 
1999). 
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and efficient.  The party requesting separate trials bears the burden of 
convincing the court that such an exercise of its discretion will (1) 
promote greater convenience to the parties, witnesses, jurors, and the 
court, (2) be conducive to expedition and economy, and (3) not result in 
undue prejudice to any party.  Merely presenting some proof which 
supports bifurcation is not enough. . . .  The benefit of bifurcation must 
outweigh the disadvantages.176 
The court went on to find that “[e]ven if the issues are separable for 
purposes of the Seventh Amendment, a court will likely decline to 
bifurcate if there will be a significant overlap of evidence at the two trials 
which would make separation inefficient and inexpedient.”177  The court 
ultimately concluded that the defendant had not met its burden of 
showing that bifurcation was justified.178 
Indeed, federal courts seem to take this burden seriously.  When 
evidence is intertwined, courts will deny a motion to bifurcate.179  
Similarly, a federal court denied a defendant’s motion to bifurcate the 
issue of punitive damages when the court was “unconvinced the 
Defendant would be prejudiced by not bifurcating these proceedings or 
that bifurcation would expedite the trial or facilitate judicial 
economy.”180  Even in the criminal context, courts are reluctant to 
bifurcate issues that could be tried together.181  Indeed, one district court 
found that the decision to bifurcate the proceedings is “one used as a last 
resort.”182 
 
 176. Id. at 387 (citations omitted). 
 177. Id. at 388. 
 178. Id. at 395; see also Belmont Textile Mach. Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 
521, 526 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (finding that defendant failed to meet its burden to justify 
bifurcation). 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Jaimes-Cruz, No. 7:08-CR-139-1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
64900, at *6–8 (E.D.N.C. July 24, 2009) (denying a defendant’s request to bifurcate 
drug-related charges from immigration-related charges); Wittenberg ex rel. J.W. v. 
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:05CV00818, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65257, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 2007) (denying a motion to bifurcate challenges to two 
different Individualized Education Programs because “[t]he factual and legal issues in the 
two claims are nearly identical”). 
 180. EEOC v. Winning Team, Inc., No. 1:07CV310, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92904, at 
*2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2008). 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Corbett, No. 3:07cr144, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92106, 
at *5 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007) (denying a defendant’s motion to bifurcate “because the 
prejudicial effect of introducing a defendant’s past conviction can be avoided through the 
use of a limiting instruction” (citing United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 844 (4th Cir. 
1984))). 
 182. Ring v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 159 F.R.D. 653, 657–58 (M.D.N.C. 1995). 
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For example, in Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc., the court provided 
three reasons for denying the defendant’s motion to bifurcate liability 
from damages.183  First, proof of damages would not be particularly 
complex.184  Second, the court found a potential overlap in the evidence 
of the two issues, which would only add to the expense of litigation if 
the two issues were tried separately.185  Third, arguments centered on 
“judicial economy” were not enough to bifurcate the issues because 
bifurcation would require a new jury for the second issue, thereby 
increasing the burden on the judiciary.186  Furthermore, if the court were 
to agree with the reasoning that bifurcation created judicial economy, 
“there would be a strong argument supporting bifurcation in nearly 
every civil trial.”187 
That is not to say, however, that federal courts always refuse to 
bifurcate proceedings.  For example, one former district court judge for 
the Middle District of North Carolina conducted a bench trial on the 
issue of liability and ordered a separate proceeding to calculate 
damages.188  Within the same district, a case of gender discrimination 
was similarly bifurcated between damages and liability.189  Another 
district court ordered bifurcation in a claim for unfair or deceptive trade 
practices,190 as did a different district court in a case of union members’ 
claims against their union,191 yet none of these courts provided detailed 
reasoning for the decision to bifurcate. 
 
 183. See Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc., No. 2:96CV00986, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15933, at *3–6 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 1997). 
 184. Id. at *3–4. 
 185. Id. at *4–5. 
 186. Id. at *5. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa, USA, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 
2d 648, 650 (M.D.N.C. 2009), aff’d, 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 189. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 456 (M.D.N.C. 2004), aff’d, 401 
F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Jordan v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. 6:93CV542, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17917, at *9–10 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 1996) (noting bifurcation of a trial in 
an age and gender discrimination case), aff’d, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33589 (4th Cir. Nov. 
26, 1997); Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., No. C-C-75-133, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15665, at *4–5 (W.D.N.C. June 28, 1977) (granting a motion for a bifurcated trial in a 
racial employment discrimination class action lawsuit). 
 190. See Wake Stone Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 995 F. Supp. 612, 613–14 
(E.D.N.C. 1998). 
 191. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 676 F. Supp. 659, 665 
(M.D.N.C. 1987), aff’d, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
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The courts that have provided reasoning have largely relied on the 
complexity of the issues at hand.192  One district court bifurcated the 
liability and damages issues in a patent infringement case “because of the 
complex nature of the damages determination and the extensive 
discovery that is often necessary to prove the nature and extent of those 
damages.”193  As one judge explained, “[t]he most common justification 
for separate trials is that the discovery and/or the trial of the issues of 
liability and damages are sufficiently complex so that the two issues 
should proceed separately.”194 
Importantly, federal courts are not bound by state rules regarding 
the propriety of bifurcation.195  In Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to separate the liability and 
damages issues even though the rules in Texas likely would have 
precluded bifurcation.196  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit upheld bifurcation 
in a diversity case even though the plaintiff alleged that he had a state 
 
 192. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. 
Supp. 2d 465, 470 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (preferring bifurcation due to the “complexity of the 
trade secret misappropriation issues”); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. Monsanto Co., No. 
1:97CV1138, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21330, at *55 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2000) (noting that 
“[t]he intent and logic of the bifurcation order was clear: in order to avoid the 
complicated issues of patent law and to promote judicial economy”), aff’d sub nom. 
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 
vacated, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002), reaff’d, 345 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Textron 
Inc. v. Barber-Colman Co., 903 F. Supp. 1570, 1582 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (noting that 
actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act “are typically bifurcated by reason of their complexity”); White Chem. Corp. v. 
Walsh Chem. Corp., 116 F.R.D. 580, 582 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (granting a motion to 
bifurcate the trial because the case involved complex issues and the overlap of evidence 
would be minimal); EEOC v. Olin Corp. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, Local No. 
1971, No. A-C-78-186, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9646, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 1980) 
(noting that bifurcation was ordered “in view of the size and complexity of the case”), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 
1982), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 193. Novopharm Ltd. v. Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D.N.C. 1998), aff’d 
per curiam sub nom. TorPharm, Inc. v. Genpharm Inc., No. 99-1362, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 11589 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 2000). 
 194. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 388 (M.D.N.C. 
1999) (citing Novopharm, 181 F.R.D. at 311). 
 195. See, e.g., Oulds v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 
1993) (noting that “bifurcation of trials is permissible in federal court even when such 
procedure is contrary to state law”). 
 196. See Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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“constitutional right to have all the issues of fact submitted to the same 
jury at the same time.”197 
As in the North Carolina state courts, federal courts may also 
bifurcate under other circumstances.  For example, a court may bifurcate 
claims against private parties, which are heard before juries, from claims 
against the United States, which can only be heard by the court.198  One 
federal court granted a motion to bifurcate a declaratory judgment claim 
regarding the existence of a partnership and a claim of unjust 
enrichment from other claims of liability.199  Another court granted a 
motion to bifurcate a trial “into non-secret and secret segments” to keep 
the public from uncovering sensitive trade confidences.200 
More generally, federal courts have held that “[b]ifurcation of 
proceedings into separate trials concerning liability and damages is 
appropriate when ‘the evidence pertinent to the two issues is wholly 
unrelated’ and the evidence relevant to the damages issue could have a 
prejudicial impact upon the jury’s liability determination.”201  In other 
words, bifurcation is deemed acceptable in that it “furthers convenience 
when the separable issues are substantially different.”202  This standard 
seems to be in line with Supreme Court precedent on the propriety of 
granting a partial new trial, which is permitted if it “clearly appears that 
the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a 
trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”203 
 
 197. Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965) (citing 
Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 354 S.W.2d 464, 471 (Tenn. 1962), abandoned 
by Ennix v. Clay, 703 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tenn. 1986)). 
 198. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (M.D.N.C. 2010). 
 199. See Walker v. White, No. 1:06-CV-350, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67157, at *2 
(W.D.N.C. June 10, 2010). 
 200. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1299 (E.D.N.C. 1996), aff’d, 
110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 201. Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 212 (6th Cir. 1985); see also 9A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390 
(3d ed. 2013). 
 202. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Swenson, No. 07-2983, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107482, at 
*21 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2011); see also Cardiac Sci., Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. 
N.V., No. 03-1064, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16881, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2003) 
(noting how the jury could benefit from separation of issues involving a complex patent 
dispute); 8 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE–CIVIL § 42.20[4][b] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 
2013) (discussing how bifurcation may further convenience). 
 203. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931) (citing 
Norfolk S. R.R. Co. v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269, 274 (1915)). 
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IV. EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF BIFURCATION 
North Carolina’s new law creates a chasm not only between North 
Carolina and other states but also between North Carolina and federal 
jurisprudence.  The wisdom of such a move is unclear.  There is little 
consensus on the value of bifurcation in general, and as one federal court 
described: 
Those who favor the trial of liability separate from damages in personal 
injury actions emphasize the time savings, and also suggest that in 
theory there should be no difference in the eventual outcome of the case.  
But an equally impressive argument is advanced that in many cases, 
especially personal injury negligence cases, the separation might affect 
the outcome of the case.204 
Weighing these considerations, the Third Circuit “disapprove[d] of a 
general practice of bifurcating all negligence cases.”205  More generally, 
the scholarly debate in favor of and against bifurcation rages strong 
across the country.206 
According to the Connecticut Health Care Advisory Board, the 
traditional system of non-bifurcation “implicitly implies the assumption 
of wrongdoing.”207  It is somewhat ironic that civil defendants claim that 
non-bifurcated proceedings imply fault while criminal defendants claim 
that bifurcated proceedings imply the same thing.  Yet North Carolina’s 
new law may imply “right-doing.”  In other words, jurors will be left to 
analyze a defendant’s liability in a vacuum, without the benefit of a full 
view on the consequences of the defendant’s actions.  Of course, that 
may be the very purpose of bifurcation for some supporters.  The theory 
in favor of bifurcation is that when jurors disagree on liability, an award 
of damages becomes a “bartering mechanism” through which jurors can 
settle their differences.208  Thus, the theory goes, jurors improperly 
 
 204. Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Compare Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705 (2000) 
(presenting a very strong case in favor of bifurcation), with Jennifer M. Granholm & 
William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury’s Role, 
26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505 (1995) (presenting a very strong case against bifurcation).  See 
generally John P. Rowley III & Richard G. Moore, Bifurcation of Civil Trials, 45 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1 (2010) (citing many of the relevant opinions in favor of and against 
bifurcation). 
 207. Final Report to Governor Rell and the General Assembly, CONN. HEALTH CARE 
ADVISORY BD., 19 (June 30, 2010), http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/final_report_advisory_ 
brd_june2010.pdf. 
 208. De Villiers, supra note 2, at 178. 
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compromise to find liability in exchange for a lesser award of damages.209  
Those in the field refer to this phenomenon as “vicarious settlement.”210 
Proponents of bifurcation therefore assume that bifurcation will 
benefit litigants (in other words, defendants) by leading to more just 
results and will benefit judges by shortening the length of litigation.211  
But some have recognized that bifurcation may actually create, rather 
than solve, these problems.  The Antitrust Section of the American Bar 
Association has identified several problems with bifurcation, including 
the admissibility of evidence that would otherwise be excluded, 
increased willingness of judges to admit evidence of a defendant’s 
financial condition, and procedural complications on appeal.212  
Furthermore, separating a trial into two phases may cause delay, 
confusion, and prejudice to the plaintiff.213 
As in the criminal context, civil bifurcation may spawn as many 
concerns as it dispels.  This issue can be seen in the varying results of 
empirical studies intended to measure the effect of bifurcation.  In the 
civil context, the three principal studies “suggest that bifurcated juries 
tend to find the defendant liable less often than in comparable 
nonbifurcated trials.”214  But when the defendant is found liable, the 
awarded damages (both compensatory and punitive) are significantly 
higher.215  This result is somewhat unsurprising, as several studies have 
found that an award of damages has some correlation to the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.216  If the jury does not hear 
about the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, then the jury is 
 
 209. See id. at 172–73. 
 210. Id. at 173. 
 211. See id. at 197. 
 212. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BUSINESS TORTS: A 
PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 94 (Thomas J. Collin ed., 1998). 
 213. Id. at 84. 
 214. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 662, 671 (2001). 
 215. See id. at 672 (noting that in “civil trials, bifurcation tends to reduce the odds of a 
defendant being found liable but appears to foster larger damage awards when the 
defendant is deemed liable”).  Some research refutes this argument, however.  See, e.g., 
Edith Greene et al., Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation 
Necessary?, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 197–98 (2000) (finding that “trial structure had 
no effect on compensatory damages”).  Greene and her colleagues also found that 
“[c]ontrary to the assumptions of many commentators, evidence related to punitive 
damages did not prejudice mock jurors’ thinking about compensatory damages.”  Id. at 
201. 
 216. See Greene et al., supra note 215, at 196–97, 201. 
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less likely to find the defendant liable.217  In the criminal arena, however, 
bifurcated proceedings may make juries more likely to convict.218  No 
research has yet analyzed this discrepancy. 
This Article is certainly not the first to recognize a parallel between 
bifurcation in criminal and civil contexts.  “In the context of criminal 
law, bifurcation of the guilt and punishment phases of trial is accepted as 
a procedure necessary in many instances to satisfy due process.  The 
similarities between the process of deciding civil liability and criminal 
guilt are numerous.”219  However, the analogy may be more apt between 
criminal sentencing and punitive damages, as both are intended to 
punish the defendant and deter additional wrongdoing.220  
Compensatory damages, on the other hand, are not intended to punish 
the defendant at all.221 
Still, a law such as North Carolina’s that institutes a presumption in 
favor of bifurcation has implications for all parties involved in 
litigation—judges, plaintiffs, defendants, and juries.222  Bifurcation 
creates a morass of complex issues including potential prejudice to the 
parties, the necessity of additional evidentiary rulings, the pursuit of 
judicial economy, and the role of the jury.  These issues are discussed 
below. 
A. Prejudice—To Either Party 
The traditional theory of civil bifurcation is that it helps the 
defendant by removing the emotional and sympathetic factor concerning 
 
 217. See id. at 200–01. 
 218. See generally Verla Seetin Neslund, Comment, The Bifurcated Trial: Is It Used 
More Than It Is Useful?, 31 EMORY L.J. 441, 441–42 (1982) (noting how opponents of 
bifurcation in criminal trials argue that it is impossible for juries to draw the line 
between guilt and sanity, thus generally leading to more convictions). 
 219. Tom Alan Cunningham & Paula K. Hutchinson, Bifurcated Trials: Creative Uses 
of the Moriel Decision, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 807, 809 (1994) (citation omitted). 
 220. See, e.g., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C. 1976) 
(“North Carolina has consistently allowed punitive damages solely on the basis of its 
policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter others from similar behavior.”). 
 221. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 25.1 (3d ed. 2007) 
(“The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for 
the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s breach of duty.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 222. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3) (2013). 
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the plight of the plaintiff from the jury’s deliberations.223  While 
bifurcation may actually prejudice the plaintiff as a result, it may have 
the unexpected potential for prejudicing the defendant as well. 
Bifurcation may hurt or help a plaintiff, depending on the strength 
of the evidence and the “distribution of risk attitudes” among the 
jurors.224  If the evidence of liability is weak or unclear, bifurcation will 
prejudice the plaintiff by removing from the jury any evidence of injury 
and any proclivity toward sympathy.225  Furthermore, if the jury is 
already inclined to mistrust personal injury or tort plaintiffs, then 
bifurcation could prejudice the plaintiff for the same reasons.226  The 
result will, of course, turn on the facts of the case—both before and 
during trial. 
Additional prejudice to the plaintiff may be evident in a less visible 
but similarly concrete way.  There is something to be said for an injured 
plaintiff having an opportunity to have his day in court to say, “This is 
what you did to me.”  Regardless of whether the defendant is found 
liable, there is often a need for psychological closure to a traumatic 
event.  Presenting evidence of damages may be precisely the thing for 
which a plaintiff is looking, regardless of the ultimate outcome. 
Bifurcation is not intended to take away a plaintiff’s right to a jury 
trial, but bifurcation may muddy the waters when one considers its 
practical implications.  For example, under North Carolina’s new 
legislation, the trial judge will have to determine whether proffered 
evidence relates “solely to compensatory damages.”227  Yet the plaintiff 
seeking to prove negligence must prove four essential elements: duty, 
breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.228  Thus, a plaintiff might 
find itself in the awkward position of losing the opportunity to present 
evidence on an essential element of its claim.  Recognizing this difficulty, 
the Tenth Circuit avoided the argument by deciding a case on other 
grounds.229  Other courts have denied motions to bifurcate because proof 
 
 223. See de Villiers, supra note 2, at 191 (noting that “[c]ommentators have attributed 
the observation that unitary trials lead to more liability verdicts than bifurcated trials to 
the possibility of jury sympathy for the plaintiff”). 
 224. Id. at 158. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b). 
 228. See, e.g., Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 505 S.E.2d 131, 135–38 (N.C. 1998) 
(discussing general negligence principles). 
 229. See Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985) (declining 
to decide whether bifurcation prejudiced the plaintiff by precluding him from presenting 
evidence of damages because the issue of probable cause was dispositive of his claim). 
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of damages is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim.230  Still other 
courts have attempted to distinguish “[p]roof of damage” from 
“calculation of damages.”231  But the North Carolina General Assembly 
has not given any guidance on how to address these issues.  Plaintiffs in 
North Carolina, and their attorneys, may be asking themselves how they 
can avoid a directed verdict when they are not permitted to offer 
evidence of injury.232  “The substantive law applicable in [the field of 
torts] makes actual damage a prerequisite to a plaintiff’s right of 
action[,]”233 yet in some ways, bifurcation makes actual damage an 
afterthought. 
An extreme example of this difficulty can be seen in the case of 
Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, arising out of the state courts of Arizona.234  The 
underlying claim in the case was relatively straightforward—personal 
injury attorneys alleged that two companies charged unreasonable fees 
to produce medical records.235  Before trial, the judge granted the 
attorneys’ motion to bifurcate the proceedings into liability and damages 
phases.236  During the liability phase, the parties were not allowed to 
introduce evidence relating to damages.237  The companies moved for 
judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the attorneys had no evidence 
of damages and had thus failed to establish an essential element of their 
claim.238  The judge decided to appoint a special master to determine the 
 
 230. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, No. 3:02CV210-SA, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44577, at *2–3 (N.D. Miss. June 5, 2008) (denying motion to bifurcate 
because proof of damages was essential element of tortious interference claim); see also 
Doctors Hosp. Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Webb, 704 S.E.2d 185, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) 
(recognizing that even the liability phase requires some individualized determination of 
injury). 
 231. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. 391, 396 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting the 
importance of differentiating between the presence of damage from the extent of 
damages (citing Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc. 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991))); 
Feldman v. Jackson Mem’l Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000, 1009 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (stating that 
plaintiff must prove “the fact of damage”); Martino v. McDonald’s Sys., Inc., 86 F.R.D. 
145, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (emphasizing how the “fact of damage question is distinct from 
the issue of actual damages”). 
 232. See, e.g., Gulesian v. Ne. Bank of Lincoln, 447 A.2d 814, 817 (Me. 1982) 
(affirming defendant’s motion for a directed verdict “[b]ecause there was no evidence in 
the record of damages proximately caused by the [defendant]”). 
 233. HARPER ET AL., supra note 221, § 25.1. 
 234. See Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 83 P.3d 1103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
 235. Id. at 1105. 
 236. Id. (ordering that the trial would be bifurcated, but that the same jury would 
hear both phases if liability was found). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1106. 
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proper amount of damages if the jury found the companies liable, and, 
in response, it was the same companies that argued “they had been 
prejudiced in conducting their defense by defending only on the 
question of liability and not damages.”239 
Upon review, the Arizona Court of Appeals criticized the judge’s 
handling of the case.240  The appellate court realized that “some evidence 
was precluded on the ground it related to damages, not liability.  Yet, at 
the end of the trial, the judge maintained that evidence relating to 
damages had been admitted, essentially penalizing [the companies] for 
failing to establish factual issues relating to damages.”241  The appellate 
court concluded that “because [the companies] had justifiably believed 
they were only trying the issue of liability, it was unfair to penalize them 
for conducting their defense accordingly.”242  The court remanded the 
matter for a trial on damages alone.243 
Under North Carolina’s new legislation, situations like the one in 
Chartone are more and more likely to appear.  Complicated issues 
regarding what evidence relates to injury and what evidence relates to 
causation will be inherent in most tort cases.  Bifurcation in some 
instances may actually deprive a party of a right to a fair trial under the 
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.  But there is no 
indication that the North Carolina General Assembly considered that 
implication when it cavalierly passed this new law. 
Bifurcation is ostensibly for the benefit of the defendant, yet it is 
sometimes the plaintiff that also seeks bifurcation.244  Such a maneuver 
may be a plaintiff’s effort to protect itself, but it may also be an example 
of how bifurcation can prejudice the defendant. 
Indeed, defendants may actually stand to lose by bifurcating a trial.  
According to some research, “the expected damage award for bifurcated 
trials conditional upon a finding of liability against the defendant is greater 
than the corresponding conditional expectation for unitary trials.”245  It 
seems to be true that plaintiffs win more unitary trials than bifurcated 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1111. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 1112. 
 243. Id. at 1114. 
 244. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Exch. v. Bledsoe, 540 S.E.2d 57, 59 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(granting plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate its declaratory judgment action from defendant’s 
counterclaims); see also Price v. Cannon Mills, No. C-84-1012-S, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18024, at *19 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 6, 1986) (denying plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate trial). 
 245. De Villiers, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasis in original). 
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trials.246  When liability is found, however, the damage awards are 
usually higher in bifurcated trials than in unitary trials.247 
Moreover, some courts have recommended bifurcation as a way to 
lessen the prejudice to the plaintiff rather than the defendant.  For 
example, in Taylor v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., the Court of Appeals of 
Georgia chastened the trial court for denying a motion to bifurcate and 
remarked that “[t]he better practice would have been to bifurcate the 
trial.”248  In Taylor, a man was killed in a car accident, and the defendant 
company had sold alcohol to the driver of the other vehicle.249  The 
company introduced evidence regarding the decedent’s prior drug and 
alcohol abuse and reckless driving, apparently in an attempt to shield 
itself from liability.250  Aside from the relevancy problems, the court 
explained that even if the evidence were relevant to damages, it should 
have been separated into a separate damage proceeding to avoid 
prejudice to the plaintiff.251  In this situation, bifurcation may actually 
prejudice the defendant by taking away its ability to present all relevant 
facts to the jury. 
Thus, both sides may be prejudiced by bifurcating the liability 
phase from the damages phase.  Yet bifurcation is purportedly instituted 
“to ‘avoid prejudice,’ not to create it.”252  If it is shown that a general 
practice of bifurcation is prejudicial to the plaintiff or the defendant, 
such a practice deserves a second look. 
B. Evidentiary Problems 
Generally, bifurcation is not allowed when evidence on the issues 
overlaps or the issues are so “intertwined” that attempts at separation 
will actually lead to more confusion and less efficiency.253  Conversely, 
bifurcation is generally permitted if the two subjects are not 
intertwined.254  According to the North Carolina General Assembly, 
therefore, evidence of liability and evidence of damages will not be 
 
 246. Id. at 191. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Taylor v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 519 S.E.2d 282, 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 249. Id. at 283. 
 250. Id. at 284. 
 251. Id. at 285. 
 252. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., Inc., 668 F.2d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b)). 
 253. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 201, § 2390. 
 254. See id. 
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intertwined in tort cases in which the plaintiff seeks more than $150,000 
in damages.255  That assumption necessitates a closer examination. 
A hypothetical example might make this evidentiary problem more 
concrete.256  Peter is a twelve-year-old boy who is riding in a vehicle that 
is involved in a head-on collision.  As a result of the collision, the 
vehicle’s spare tire is dislodged, hits the seat in which Peter is sitting, 
and renders him a paraplegic.  Peter’s parents bring suit against the 
vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging that the system intended to keep the 
spare tire in place was defective.  Peter’s expert witness proposes to 
testify that the impact from the tire was the primary cause of Peter’s 
injuries and that Peter would not be a paraplegic if he had not been hit 
by the tire. 
Assuming the trial is bifurcated under the new law, what evidence 
is about liability and what evidence is about damages?  Would Peter’s 
expert witness be permitted to testify that a dislodged tire could cause 
paraplegia?  Could he testify that Peter would not have been injured in 
absence of the impact?  Or would the testimony be limited to potential 
injuries that could be caused by a dislodged tire?  If the latter, would 
Peter be receiving a fair trial?  Furthermore, would Peter need to hire a 
separate expert to testify at the latter damages portion, or would he be 
required to have the same expert make a second appearance? 
Perhaps liability and damages are not as easily separated as the 
North Carolina General Assembly believes.  At least in the discovery 
context, courts have recognized that the issues are not totally “separate 
and distinct.”257  When evidence overlaps between the issues of liability 
and damages, bifurcation is generally not appropriate.258  In other words, 
“[b]ifurcation is usually not ordered when the issues of liability and 
 
 255. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3) (2013). 
 256. This example is taken from the case of Thorndike v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 
00-198-B, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8203 (D. Me. May 15, 2003). 
 257. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No. 
09-C-0916, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98573, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 7, 2010) (“Another 
reason to deny bifurcation is that damages and liability are not easily 
compartmentalized. . . .  Bifurcation would likely require the parties, and possibly this 
Court, to wade into the morass inherent in drawing lines between discovery relevant to 
damages and discovery relevant to liability.”); BASF Catalysts LLC v. Aristo, Inc., No. 
2:07-cv-222, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16263, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2009) 
(“Postponement does not equate with economy.  In fact, many courts have noted that 
bifurcation can lead to additional discovery disputes that actually add time and costs to 
the litigation.”). 
 258. See, e.g., R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc., 
585 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984) (refusing to bifurcate when the plaintiff intended 
to use “some of the same witnesses” on the issues of liability and damages). 
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damages are intertwined and witnesses who testify regarding liability can 
also be expected to testify as to damages.”259  The General Assembly has 
not provided any reason to conclude that the issues of liability and 
damages are generally not intertwined in tort cases, yet the law assumes 
that they can be easily distinguished.260  Courts have recognized, though, 
that in some instances, “factors concerning the cause and nature of the 
injuries would, unavoidably, have been adduced at a separate trial on 
liability.”261  It is far from clear that evidence of liability and evidence of 
damages can be as easily separated as the General Assembly assumed. 
Furthermore, the same problems that plague voir dire procedures in 
the criminal context are present, to some degree, in the civil context.  
For example, “in a trial where the plaintiff claims a cancer due to trauma, 
[counsel] could hardly be prevented from explaining the nature of the 
injury in order to find out whether the attitude of the panel is opposed 
to traumatic etiology in such diseases.”262  In other words, a description 
of the injury may be necessary to ascertain jurors’ views on the claimed 
injury, much like a description of the sentencing proceeding in a capital 
murder case may be necessary to ascertain jurors’ views on the death 
penalty.  Does such evidence relate “solely” to compensatory damages, or 
does the voir dire procedure bring it beyond that scope?  If the former, it 
should not be permitted under the new law.263 
In a similar vein, evidence of damages may be necessary for a 
certain inference to be made.  For example, the injuries received by a 
party in an automobile accident are likely “relating solely to 
compensatory damages.”264  Yet those same injuries are also indicative of 
how fast the other vehicle was traveling.  The propriety of excluding 
such evidence has not been established, and courts will have to grapple 
with these and similar issues under the new law. 
“Certainly, where evidence of damages is extraordinarily complex or 
time consuming and it is not necessary to deal with it during the liability 
phase, bifurcation of liability and damages makes good sense.”265  But 
even if that is true, a presumption in favor of bifurcation, such as North 
 
 259. Drumm v. Schell, No. 4:07-CV-357, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45920, at *3 (M.D. 
Pa. June 11, 2008). 
 260. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3). 
 261. Hardee Mfg. Co. v. Josey, 535 So. 2d 655, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
 262. Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the 
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 849 (1961). 
 263. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Cunningham & Hutchinson, supra note 219, at 815. 
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Carolina’s, assumes that in all tort cases the evidence of damages is 
extraordinarily complex or time consuming.  The evidentiary 
implications of bifurcation in the ordinary course of things have yet to 
be delineated, and North Carolina courts now find themselves faced with 
yet another daunting task. 
As Judge Weinstein predicted back in 1961, “[t]he attempt to seal 
off the jury treatment of liability will probably be met by the 
development of new techniques and strategies to introduce evidence of 
injuries during the trial of the liability issue.”266  Litigants in North 
Carolina will now have the opportunity and the motivation to fulfill 
Judge Weinstein’s prophecy. 
C. Judicial Economy 
Another proffered reason to bifurcate trials is to promote judicial 
economy.  If a defendant is not found liable, a second phase on damages 
is unnecessary.  Even if the defendant is found liable, the parties may be 
more likely to settle.  Thus, the theory goes, bifurcation serves to 
shorten the length of trial and save the resources of both the parties and 
the courts.267  But this assumption also deserves closer inspection. 
Empirical evidence does suggest that bifurcation actually shortens 
the length of trials.268  In 1959, a federal court in Illinois imposed a local 
rule that any party could move for a separate trial on the issue of 
liability.269  In response to this rule, a study was conducted to determine 
the amount of time that would be saved by separating the issues.270  Of 
186 personal injury cases tried in front of a jury during the study period, 
sixty-nine (or thirty-seven percent) were bifurcated into liability and 
damages phases.271  Of the non-bifurcated cases, seventy-eight percent 
continued to the end of the trial; of the bifurcated cases, only fifteen 
percent did.272  After attempting to control for several variables, the 
authors of the study concluded that bifurcation “will save, on the 
average, about 20 per cent [sic] of the time that would be required if 
these cases were tried under traditional [one-phase] rules.”273 
 
 266. Weinstein, supra note 262, at 852. 
 267. See Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical 
Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1606 n.3 (1963). 
 268. Id. at 1624. 
 269. Id. at 1606–07. 
 270. Id. at 1607. 
 271. Id. at 1609. 
 272. Id. at 1610. 
 273. Id. at 1624. 
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No study has contradicted that finding, and yet it is still 
incomplete.274 For example, the authors of the study did not consider the 
length of time that passed before trial.275  A statutory mandate, such as 
North Carolina’s, will certainly move parties, usually defendants, to seek 
bifurcation.276  Judges will then have to determine additional issues, 
including: (1) whether the opposing party can show good cause to avoid 
bifurcation, (2) whether discovery should be bifurcated between liability 
and damages, and (3) exactly what evidence will or will not be permitted 
in the liability phase.277  These decisions will likely entail hearings and 
additional time, but those considerations are not considered in the 
general argument that bifurcation shortens the length of trials.278  Given 
these additional factors, one wonders whether under laws like North 
Carolina’s “little if any time, expense or burden would be spared.”279 
In the ordinary tort case, the issue of damages may be less complex 
than the issue of liability.  Assuming the defendant is liable, it could be a 
comparatively straightforward task to determine the amount that the 
plaintiff should be compensated.  Hence, when other courts have 
considered motions to bifurcate the damages phase, they have 
recognized that “the savings might amount to only a day of testimony.  
Such savings would evaporate should the damages phase become 
necessary.  Furthermore, bifurcation requires a certain degree of 
duplication of efforts by the parties, counsel, and the Court.”280  Thus, 
even if the actual time spent in trial decreases, that is not to say that 
judicial economy is necessarily served.  Indeed, “the mere possibility that 
a trial on damages may become unnecessary does not establish that the 
bifurcation promotes judicial economy.”281 
 
 274. See generally Landsman et al., supra note 24 (discussing several of the limitations 
of the study and questions that it has spawned). 
 275. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 267, at 1624. 
 276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3) (2013). 
 277. Albert P. Bedecarre, Comment, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation At an Extreme: 
Polyfurcation of Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
123, 135, 160−62 (1989). 
 278. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 267, at 1624 (omitting in the conclusion that 
bifurcation shortens trials the likely necessary argument and additional time required for 
judges to determine these issues). 
 279. Diagnostic Devices, Inc. v. TaiDoc Tech. Corp., No. 3:08cv149-RJC-DCK, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70282, at *13 (W.D.N.C. June 18, 2010). 
 280. Kelley v. Steel Transp., Inc., No. 09-CV-14318, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47869, at 
*13–14 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2011). 
 281. Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Cothern, No. L-93-112, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 926, at 
*12 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1995). 
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Moreover, it is uncertain whether bifurcation aids or hinders 
settlement.  At least one court found it important to ensure discovery of 
both liability and damages because a full understanding of damages “not 
only assists the parties in preparing for trial, it also educates each party 
on the other’s view of the damages, which, in turn, assists each party in 
evaluating essential elements of the matters in issue and in assessing the 
risks associated with an adverse decision in the action.”282  Thus, a 
unitary trial may actually facilitate settlement, thereby serving judicial 
economy.  Other courts have found, however, that bifurcation may help 
settlement because once liability is determined, “the knowledge of the 
liability verdict and the savings in cost of expensive damage discovery 
will provide both room and the means for compromise.”283 
A bifurcated proceeding merely modifies, rather than eliminates, 
much of the pre-trial debate.  If evidence on damages is precluded until a 
later proceeding in which it is deemed necessary, parties may avoid 
fighting over certain expert witnesses, evidence of injuries, and damage 
calculations.  However, those debates would simply be replaced with 
debates over what evidence will be admitted in the liability phase—
specifically, what will and will not be permitted.  Once again, it is 
unclear whether bifurcation actually serves to promote judicial 
economy. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if the entire purpose of 
bifurcation is to expedite tort litigation, then the provision may be 
proper.284  But if there is more at stake, such as prejudice to either party 
and preservation of the jury’s role, then a closer examination is required 
before North Carolina or other states enact such a drastic change in 
litigation practice.  “While economy and convenience may properly be 
considered in the decision to bifurcate, neither is the ultimate 
objective.”285  Indeed, “[a] paramount consideration at all times in the 
administration of justice is a fair and impartial trial to all litigants.  
Considerations of economy of time, money and convenience of 
witnesses must yield thereto.”286  In its haste, the North Carolina General 
 
 282. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 35 (D. Del. 1995). 
 283. F&G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 392 (M.D.N.C. 
1999); see also Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, 172 F.R.D. 1, 5−6, 8 (D.P.R. 
1997) (finding that bifurcation may promote judicial economy by, among other things, 
facilitating settlement). 
 284. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 267, at 1624. 
 285. Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980). 
 286. Id. (quoting Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)); 
see also Weinstein, supra note 262, at 832 (“The bifurcation rule . . . has within it 
potentialities for a major change in the relative position of plaintiffs and defendants in 
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Assembly may have missed the importance of that paramount 
consideration. 
D. The Jury’s Perspective 
While the three issues described above have received significant 
attention in the literature, little has been said about how the juries 
themselves are affected by bifurcation.  Courts have recognized that “the 
traditional role of the factfinder [is] to make an ultimate determination 
on the basis of the case presented in its entirety.”287  The jury is expected 
to listen to all of the evidence and make a reasoned decision that 
represents the will of the public at large.288  Thus, federal courts have 
expressed concern that bifurcation “would cause greater delay and might 
complicate the proceedings by creating a piecemeal quality to the trial, 
making it harder for the trier of fact to see the case as a whole.”289  
Mandatory bifurcation does not take away the fact that the evidence in a 
unitary proceeding may give a more complete picture of what really 
happened.  From the jury’s point of view, for example, seeing how much 
someone actually suffered may be necessary to determine whether the 
defendant’s action was a proximate cause of injury sufficient to impose 
liability. 
The rules on remand recognize the importance of the jury’s 
perspective.290  As explained earlier, courts on remand can only retry a 
solitary issue if the remaining issues are completely separate and 
distinct.291  According to one commentator, “[t]he particular frailties of 
juries, while decried by some, were not the overriding concern of the 
Court in making this decision.  The Court focused instead on avoiding 
confusion of the trier of fact due to incomplete information.”292  Perhaps 
similar consideration should be given to the jury’s role in the first 
instance. 
 
negligence cases and the rule cannot be appraised merely by procedural efficiency tests 
which might be appropriate for other proposed procedures.”). 
 287. Real v. Bunn-o-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 288. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 2 (2013). 
 289. Belmont Textile Mach. Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (W.D.N.C. 
1999). 
 290. See Jones v. Harrelson & Smith Contractors, LLC, 670 S.E.2d 242, 252 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
 291. See Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
 292. Bedecarre, supra note 277, at 129. 
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Bifurcation is also intended to help the jury make a more logical 
decision without being swayed by sympathy for the injured party.293  But 
torts such as “[w]rongful death actions, in and of themselves, are 
sufficient to evoke the sympathy of most juries.  The fact that such 
actions necessarily involve testimony related to the death of a mother, 
father or child does not require bifurcation of the liability and damage 
issues.”294  Sympathy, in and of itself, is not a sufficient reason to 
bifurcate all tort proceedings.  Jurors are already instructed to make their 
decision based on the facts and “not be swayed by pity, sympathy, 
partiality or public opinion.”295  North Carolina’s new law implicitly 
assumes that juries do not or cannot follow that charge. 
Protecting against jury sympathy may have more of a role in non-
tort cases in any event.  A jury determining whether a defendant has 
breached a contract or violated a criminal statute should not be swayed 
by the effect on the alleged victim.  But a jury determining whether a 
defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances may want to know 
how that reasonable or unreasonable action affected others, even if, in 
theory, the determination of liability should not be swayed by the 
resultant damages.296  An otherwise unreasonable risk seems a lot more 
reasonable if it does not harm anyone.  Conversely, an otherwise 
reasonable risk seems unreasonable when it harms others a great deal.  
While it could be argued that the effects of conduct should not taint a 
jury’s determination of reasonableness, it is also arguable that jurors 
make a less-informed decision without the benefit of all of the 
information. 
In addition, North Carolina’s highest court presumes that jurors 
follow a trial court’s instructions.297  The General Assembly did not 
explain why that presumption was inadequate in tort claims involving 
damages more than $150,000.  Indeed, courts usually recognize that 
jurors are often asked to make contingent determinations.298  In any trial, 
 
 293. See Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Cothern, No. L-93-112, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 926, 
at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1995). 
 294. Id. 
 295. North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil § 150.12 (2012). 
 296. Note, Separation of Issues of Liability and Damages in Personal Injury Cases: An 
Attempt to Combat Congestion by Rule of Court, 46 IOWA L. REV. 815, 827 (1961) 
(“Perhaps it can be said unequivocally that juries have no business considering the extent 
of damages in deciding the issue of liability.”). 
 297. Scarborough v. Dillard’s, Inc., 693 S.E.2d 640, 651 (N.C. 2009) (Timmons-
Goodson, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Cummings, 536 S.E.2d 36, 53 (N.C. 2000)). 
 298. United States v. Au Optronics Corp., No. C 09-00110 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77494, at *15 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011). 
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bifurcated or not, the justice system expects a jury to determine whether 
the defendant is liable and then determine the extent of the plaintiff’s 
injuries.  To protect the jury system itself, courts “invoke a ‘presumption’ 
that jurors understand and follow their instructions.”299  As the 
Honorable Frank Easterbrook explained, “this is not a bursting bubble, 
applicable only in the absence of better evidence.  It is a rule of law—a 
description of the premises underlying the jury system, rather than a 
proposition about jurors’ abilities and states of mind.”300  This 
foundational principle remains true, even if juries reach compromise 
verdicts that are the foundation of the theory in support of bifurcation.301  
The difference between bifurcation and ordinary jury instructions is that 
in a bifurcated setting, “the jury cannot fill the void created by the 
court’s ruling.”302  Whether that problem is a negative or is a positive for 
the jury system remains to be determined, but it is, at the very least, an 
issue to consider. 
Some have further argued that bifurcation actually helps the jury by 
making a trial more manageable and by giving the jurors more discrete 
issues to decide.303  However, research has not always shown that to be 
the case.304  One study found that “bifurcation does not enhance memory 
of compensatory case facts and most legal instructions about 
compensatory damages.”305  And it is often the most difficult cases that 
reach the jury in the first place.306  Once again, it is unclear what effect 
bifurcation has on the jurors themselves. 
Knowledge of the bifurcation will affect the way that jurors react to 
testimony.  Judge Weinstein provided this helpful commentary: 
Many of the advantages foreseen from split trials might well be lost, if it 
is known that the same jury is to be used.  Some jurors are rather 
sophisticated and they might well inform their fellows that they ought to 
find for the plaintiff if they wanted to hear the medical testimony and 
give the plaintiff “something” even though he might have been partly 
responsible for the accident.307 
 
 299. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 300. Id. 
 301. See id. (“Jurors reach compromise verdicts, although they aren’t supposed to.”). 
 302. Granholm & Richards, supra note 206, at 510. 
 303. Bedecarre, supra note 277, at 138–41. 
 304. Landsman et al., supra note 24, at 333. 
 305. Id. 
 306. See, e.g., Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us 
about Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137, 
140 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
 307. Weinstein, supra note 262, at 849. 
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Conversely, sophisticated jurors might also realize that finding in favor 
of the plaintiff means that they will have to endure another set of 
evidence and another set of deliberations.  As a result, some jurors may 
be tempted to find in favor of the defendant simply to shorten their own 
time in the jury box.  Subconsciously or consciously, then, the 
bifurcated procedure affects the way that jurors view a trial. 
In addition to how jurors independently view a bifurcated trial, the 
defendant may use bifurcation as a sword, rather than as a shield, only to 
further exacerbate this problem.  Defendants could use bifurcation as a 
tool to manipulate jurors to find in their favor.  This possibility can be 
seen in one recent case in which the defendant made this closing 
argument in the liability phase of a bifurcated trial: “If you answer ‘yes’ 
to any of these issues, [plaintiff’s counsel] will talk about another phase 
of this trial, okay?  And we’re back for another phase of this trial, okay?  
Got to answer the first six issues ‘no.’”308  If there was any doubt as to 
whether the jurors understood the implications of the first decision, 
such doubt was wholly obliterated through the defendant’s frank 
statement.  The judicial system trusts jurors to make fair and deliberate 
decisions, but common sense may push jurors to get out of jury duty as 
quickly as possible. 
V. NORTH CAROLINA’S PREDICAMENT 
Not only does North Carolina’s judicial system face problems 
associated with jurors’ views of bifurcation, but it also must battle 
through the unknown and possibly unintended consequences of 
adopting such a novel rule.  North Carolina lawyers and judges will be 
the first to encounter any unanticipated problems as they interpret the 
new statute without any guidance from the General Assembly.  This Part 
first describes the difficulties with North Carolina being the only state to 
have such a provision.  It then offers a suggestion for judges attempting 
to apply the provision and a suggestion for other states considering such 
a change in their litigation procedure. 
A. Unwisely Breaking New Ground 
North Carolina’s adoption of the new law, creating a presumption 
in favor of bifurcated trials, contradicts the established rules in the 
 
 308. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 36, Muteff v. Invacare Corp., 721 S.E. 2d 379 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (No. COA 11-495). 
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majority of jurisdictions.309  The Sixth Circuit admonished that 
bifurcation “should be resorted to only in the exercise of informed 
discretion and in a case and at a juncture which move the court to 
conclude that such action will really further convenience or avoid 
prejudice.”310  Furthermore, the new law contravenes what other 
jurisdictions have long accepted as the preferred procedural practice.  
For example, it is “a settled principle in Texas law [that] liability and 
damage issues are so interrelated in a personal injury case that it is error 
to try them separately.”311  Unlike the evidence relating to punitive 
damages, the line between evidence of a defendant’s liability and the 
evidence used to calculate compensatory damages is much harder to 
demarcate. 
In addition to the absence of any past or current precedent for 
North Carolina’s decision, bifurcation of liability and compensatory 
damages in tort cases is “[t]he most hotly debated development in issue 
bifurcation, and the slowest to gain acceptance for common usage.”312  
One wonders why the General Assembly adopted such a drastic change 
in the most controversial area within tort law without so much as 
conducting research into the rule’s efficacy, considering its future 
implications, or providing any rationale for their decision.  As of now, 
the statute separates punitive damages and compensatory damages from 
the question of liability, but is it a far leap for the General Assembly to 
later bifurcate another piece of the trial, such as causation?  This type of 
“polyfurcation” is not necessarily in the public or the judicial system’s 
best interest.313  North Carolina’s new presumption favoring bifurcation 
creates an atmosphere of uncertainty for judges and lawyers as they try 
to sort out the implications of the new law. 
Although North Carolina is the only state to create a presumption 
in favor of bifurcation by statute, New York has a clear policy favoring 
bifurcation of liability from damages adopted by regulation.314  In New 
York, “[j]udges are encouraged to order a bifurcated trial of the issues of 
liability and damages in any action for personal injury where it appears 
that bifurcation may assist in a clarification or simplification of issues 
 
 309. See, e.g., Rowley & Moore, supra note 206, at 6–9. 
 310. Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965) (quoting 
Frasier v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 119 F. Supp. 495, 497 (D. Neb. 1954)). 
 311. Cunningham & Hutchinson, supra note 219, at 810 (citing Eubanks v. Winn, 
420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967)). 
 312. Bedecarre, supra note 277, at 134. 
 313. See generally id. (discussing the problems and implications associated with 
“polyfurcation” under Rule 42(b)). 
 314. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.42 (2011). 
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and a fair and more expeditious resolution of the action.”315  However, 
even that standard has an exception, “where the nature of the injuries 
has an important bearing on the question of liability.”316  Nevertheless, a 
comprehensive national study, albeit a few years old, found that 
bifurcation is still relatively rare.317  Perhaps there is a reason for the 
majority of jurisdictions’ reluctance to encourage bifurcation of 
compensatory damages from the defendant’s liability. 
North Carolina’s adoption of a presumption in favor of bifurcation 
also eliminates much of the judge’s discretion, which goes against the 
traditional view of utilizing bifurcation only when it will decrease 
prejudice and increase judicial efficiency.  Courts have recognized that 
in some instances jury sympathy is inevitable.318  Similarly, it may be 
that the defendant has no likelihood of winning on the issue of liability 
and, therefore, bifurcation would be improper.319  Or the opposite may 
be true, such that bifurcation is appropriate in the interests of efficiency 
and judicial economy when there is a clear showing that the plaintiff has 
no likelihood of winning on the liability issue.320  However, on other 
occasions, the issues of liability and damages will be so interrelated such 
that bifurcation is not appropriate.321  The difficulty exists in the 
establishment of a presumption of bifurcation, which largely removes 
the discretion afforded to trial judges in every other aspect of the trial 
proceedings. 
The problem is not simply that North Carolina’s rule is different 
than other jurisdictions, but that the General Assembly has forged ahead 
with the new rule on bifurcation without analyzing the effect or value of 
the old rules.  For example, North Carolina, in contrast to every other 
state, already had a separate rule of severance for cases against a 
 
 315. Id. 
 316. Fetterman v. Evans, 612 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
 317. Louis Harris et al., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and 
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 731, 734 (1989) (finding that, overall, “bifurcation is used only occasionally”). 
 318. Ake v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 877 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying 
motion to bifurcate because some evidence would be relevant to both phases and jury 
sympathy would exist in any case, as jury in both phases would know that the decedent 
had died in a fire). 
 319. See, e.g., Fetz v. E & L Truck Rental Co., 670 F. Supp. 261, 265–66 (S.D. Ind. 
1987). 
 320. See, e.g., Hahn v. Woodlyn Fire Co., 32 F.R.D. 429, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
 321. See, e.g., Thorndike ex rel. Thorndike v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 220 F.R.D. 6, 8 
(D. Me. 2004). 
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managed-care entity.322  Under the managed-care rule, when a party 
includes a claim involving a managed-care entity and files a motion, the 
court must order “separate discovery and a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim.”323  Thus, bifurcation in 
this situation is mandatory so long as a motion is made, and, given the 
wording of the rule, there is little doubt as to the intended beneficiary of 
such a provision. North Carolina is the only state to codify such a 
requirement even though research has not been conducted into this 
provision’s benefit. 
Furthermore, and more conspicuously, North Carolina has already 
separated the issue of liability for punitive damages from the issue of 
liability for compensatory damages.324  In cases that must analyze 
punitive damages, there may be less prejudice than in the liability-
damages bifurcation because the type of evidence permitted in punitive 
damages may cloud the issue of liability.  One federal court found that 
bifurcation of the liability and damages phases of a products liability trial 
was not required when “exclusion of the evidence of other incidents and 
the punitive damages claims reduced many of the prejudice and 
complexity issues of concern to the defendant.”325  North Carolina, 
however, has not attempted to undergo any systematic research into the 
benefit of this type of bifurcation, even though it has been instituted for 
more than ten years. 
In contrast, one of the states that is dealing with bifurcation and 
attempting to understand its consequences is Ohio.  Ohio is 
investigating the constitutionality of a mandatory bifurcation provision 
for punitive damages cases.326  During the oral argument in Flynn v. 
Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd., counsel for the defendant 
argued that both parties had a substantive right to a fair trial.327  Implicit 
in that argument is that mandatory bifurcation provides a fair—or 
fairer—trial, but nobody has attempted to explain whether that 
 
 322. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(2) (2013). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. § 1D-30. 
 325. Nakajima v. General Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 326. See Flynn v. Fairview Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 970 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ohio 2012) 
(per curiam) (noting that “[b]y denying appellants’ motions to bifurcate under R.C. 
2315.21(B), the trial court implicitly determined that the S.B. 80 amendment to the 
statutory provision is unconstitutional, i.e., that Civ.R. 42(B) prevails over the 
conflicting statutory provision”). 
 327. Oral Argument at 8:05, Flynn v. Fairview Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 970 N.E.2d 927 
(No. 2010-1881), available at http://www.supremecourtofohiomedialibrary.org/ 
Media.aspx?fileId=132902. 
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assumption is accurate.  Defendant’s counsel conceded that “[c]ertainly 
there are going to be situations where some evidence lends itself into 
both [compensatory and punitive damage analysis].”328  If that is the 
case, then under most courts’ jurisprudence, including North Carolina’s, 
bifurcation is not proper because the issues are not completely “separate 
and distinct.”329 
Additionally, some states have followed North Carolina’s example 
and require bifurcation of punitive damages.330  Another example of 
bifurcation across the states is the requirement of bifurcation of liability 
insurance coverage from a damages claim against an insured.331  Overall, 
states have imposed rules requiring bifurcation in a limited number of 
specific cases, but North Carolina is the first state to impose such a 
broad rule of bifurcation.  In 2006, there was  “no case holding that 
courts are required to bifurcate all trials that involve questions of 
liability as well as questions of damages.”332 
Moreover, the policies behind bifurcating the issue of punitive 
damages are largely different than the policy reasons for separating 
liability determinations from compensatory damages.  Legislatures333 
have generally required, and courts334 have generally held, that some 
safeguards are necessary to ensure that defendants are not burdened 
with excessive punitive damages awards because punitive damages are 
intended to punish the defendant rather than compensate the plaintiff.335  
Bifurcating the punitive damages phase is one way to ensure that a jury 
is only given information about the defendant’s net worth when deciding 
the amount of punishment to be inflicted.336  Compensatory damages, 
 
 328. Id. at 9:44. 
 329. See, e.g., Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
 330. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(2) 
(2011). 
 331. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 18(c). 
 332. Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 537, 542 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 333. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2013) (requiring a statutory maximum of three times 
the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater, for punitive 
damage awards). 
 334. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (applying due 
process analysis to award of punitive damages when award is “grossly excessive”). 
 335. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-1 (“Punitive damages may be awarded . . . to punish a 
defendant for egregiously wrongful acts and to deter the defendant and others from 
committing similar wrongful acts.”). 
 336. See id. § 1D-3 (“In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be 
awarded, the trier of fact . . . [m]ay consider only that evidence that relates to,” among 
other things, “[t]he defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages, as evidenced by its 
revenues or net worth.”); Ward v. Beaton, 539 S.E.2d 30, 36 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
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however, are not intended to punish the defendant at all; rather, they are 
intended to compensate the plaintiff for injuries sustained.337  The 
amount of damages is significantly, if not inextricably, intertwined with 
the injury itself.338  If compensatory damages are so linked with the 
injury, it may be difficult to determine how to separate the evidence in 
the average tort case. 
That difference may explain why courts have recognized that 
bifurcation “should be carefully and cautiously applied and be utilized 
only in a case and at a juncture where informed judgment impels the 
court to conclude that application of the rule will manifestly promote 
convenience and/or actually avoid prejudice.  Piecemeal litigation is not 
to be encouraged.”339  The North Carolina General Assembly has not 
only taken that “informed judgment” away from the judiciary, but it may 
have shown a lack of informed judgment on its own part. 
Furthermore, “[i]t is the consensus view that separate trials are not 
available to litigants as a matter of right.”340  North Carolina’s new law 
seems to disagree.341  States certainly have the right, and perhaps the 
obligation, to experiment with different legislation.  As Justice Brandeis 
famously remarked, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”342  But it is also wise to examine past 
steps before taking new steps forward.  North Carolina has not studied 
the effects of bifurcation of punitive damages or the effects of bifurcation 
in medical malpractice cases, yet it now forges ahead with an even more 
comprehensive bifurcation statute.  Such experimentation is dangerous, 
if not reckless. 
 
(finding that, without bifurcation, “evidence regarding [the defendant’s] net worth was 
admissible at any time during plaintiff’s case-in-chief”). 
 337. Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 436 S.E.2d 243, 
249 (N.C. 1993) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (contrasting punitive damages with 
compensatory damages, “which are awarded to compensate and make whole the injured 
party” (quoting Cavin’s Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 220 S.E.2d 403, 406 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1975))). 
 338. See, e.g., Ammons v. S. Ry. Co., 52 S.E. 731, 732 (N.C. 1905) (explaining that 
while punitive damages “are independent of the injury inflicted or the legal wrong 
committed,” compensatory damages are “those by which the actual loss sustained is 
measured and the injured party recompensed”). 
 339. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 407 P.2d 461, 464 (Wash. 1965). 
 340. Cunningham & Hutchinson, supra note 219, at 817. 
 341. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3). 
 342. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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When serving as a laboratory, states should be diligent scientists 
and review past studies before designing new ones.  States should also be 
cautioned to maintain a realistic approach to experimentation.  As the 
Sixth Circuit admonished, there is a risk that this trend in increased 
bifurcation will create “a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which 
[liability] is parted from the reality of injury.”343 
B. A Proposed Standard 
That difficulty is largely avoidable.  For North Carolina jurists who 
are interpreting the new statute, this Article suggests implementation of 
the standard from Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc.344  Under that 
standard, a judge should only bifurcate the liability and damages issues if 
it finds that: (1) proof of damages will be sufficiently complex, (2) there 
is no potential overlap between the issues, and (3) judicial economy will 
actually be served by bifurcation.345  A contrary finding of any of these 
elements should constitute “good cause” to deny bifurcation under the 
statute.346 
For other states considering a change to their bifurcation rules, a 
similar standard should be employed.  However, rather than creating a 
presumption in favor of bifurcation, the states should follow the lead 
from federal courts and assume a single trial, but allow a party to show 
that bifurcation is appropriate under the standard set out above.  
Bifurcation is likely proper in some circumstances.  The possibility of 
inflammatory and prejudicial evidence being admitted in the liability 
phase is real.  But to place a presumption of bifurcation is to put the cart 
before the horse.  The moving party should have the burden of showing 
that evidence would be prejudicial in some way or that bifurcation is 
otherwise appropriate.  When the liability issue is complex or witnesses 
will overlap, bifurcation should be denied.347 
Instead of bifurcating the litigation, a better solution is to keep the 
trial in one proceeding and rely on the trier of fact to apply the 
appropriate standard.  Such a rule has been applied in North Carolina’s 
 
 343. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 344. Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc., No. 2:96CV00986, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15933 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 1997). 
 345. Id. at *4–6. 
 346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3). 
 347. See, e.g., R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc., 
585 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984). 
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domestic cases.348  In that setting, “[t]he statutes contain no requirement 
that the two stages in a termination of parental rights proceeding be 
conducted at two separate hearings, so long as the court applies the 
appropriate evidentiary standards at each of the two stages.”349  Indeed, 
North Carolina presumes that the trier of fact is able to separate the two 
issues and is able to consider the evidence according to the applicable 
legal standards.350  Thus, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina deemed 
it “well established” that “so long as the court applies the different 
evidentiary standards at each of the two stages, there is no requirement 
that the stages be conducted at two separate hearings.”351  In the 
domestic context, “[e]vidence heard or introduced throughout the 
adjudicatory stage, as well as any additional evidence, may be considered 
by the court during the dispositional stage.”352  That same rule can apply 
to civil cases more generally.  A presumption in favor of bifurcation is 
not necessary.  Rather, as with most civil and criminal situations, the 
decision to bifurcate should be left to the discretion of the trial judge, 
and the moving party should bear the burden of demonstrating its 
propriety. 
If judges were omniscient and could see the future enough to 
predict which cases would proceed to a damages phase, then bifurcation 
would in fact promote judicial economy without prejudicing either 
party.  If that were the case, judges could preclude evidence of damages 
altogether.  In reality, however, judges are not omniscient, and they 
certainly cannot predict how a jury will decide a particular case.  
Although some cases are more clear-cut than others, most cases fall in 
the middle.  A presumption of bifurcation in that instance is 
inappropriate. 
Empirical research, albeit flawed, has also demonstrated to some 
degree that bifurcation is not as effective as clear jury instructions.353  At 
 
 348. See In re T.H., No. COA09-835, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 2357, at *10 (N.C. Ct. 
App. Dec. 22, 2009). 
 349. Id. (citing In re Shepard, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 350. Id. at 11 (quoting In re White, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 351. In re F.G.J., 684 S.E.2d 745, 750 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting In re Shepard, 
591 S.E.2d at 6). 
 352. In re Blackburn, 543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 353. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler, Katie A. Rector & Michael J. Saks, The Impact of Jury 
Instructions on the Fusion of Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
125, 136 (2001) (finding that clear instructions did more to reduce damages than 
bifurcation). 
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least some judges agree.354  Overall, however, the research conflicts on 
whether bifurcation actually helps or hinders juries.355  Rather than forge 
ahead by adding multiple bifurcation statutes, additional research should 
be conducted to determine the efficacy of bifurcation as well as its 
prejudicial effects. 
In making this determination, courts should follow the advice given 
by appellate courts for the other bifurcation provisions under Rule 42.  
Specifically, a trial court “should enter findings and conclusions which 
clearly establish that severance is appropriate.”356  These findings and 
conclusions will not only enable a more effective appellate review but 
will also allow for a more general review of the efficacy and propriety of 
bifurcation. 
Exercising their discretion, even under a rule such as North 
Carolina’s, courts would do well to consider bifurcation and its effects 
carefully.  Courts have identified numerous factors to consider in 
making this decision.  The District Court for the District of Colorado has 
given the most comprehensive list:  
(1) Will separate trials be conducive to expedition of the litigation and 
economy?  (2) Will separate trials be in furtherance of convenience to 
the parties and avoid prejudice?  (3) Are the issues sought to be tried 
separately significantly different?  (4) Are the issues triable by jury or by 
the court?  (5) Has discovery been directed to single trial of all issues or 
separate trials?  (6) Will substantially different witnesses and evidence 
be required if issues are tried separately?  (7) Will a party opposing 
severance be significantly prejudiced if it is granted?  (8) Will an unfair 
advantage be afforded to a party if bifurcation is granted?  (9) Will 
management of trial, delineation of issues, and clarity of factual 
questions be substantially enhanced by bifurcation?  (10) Will 
bifurcation assist efficient judicial administration of the case?357 
Courts should consider all of these factors in making the bifurcation 
determination and then produce their findings and conclusions. 
 
 354. R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc., 585 F. 
Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984) (denying motion to bifurcate because any prejudice to 
defendant “can be cured with instructions to the jury”). 
 355. Compare Greene et al., supra note 215 (finding that jurors were not affected by 
bifurcated evidence), with Christine M. Shea Adams & Martin J. Bourgeois, Separating 
Compensatory and Punitive Damage Award Decisions by Trial Bifurcation, 30 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 11 (2006) (finding that bifurcated juries were more likely to use evidence 
correctly). 
 356. Wallace v. Evans, 298 S.E.2d 193, 196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 
 357. Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Whether for good or ill, “[s]eparate trials will require trial lawyers 
to depart from long established modes of trial procedure.”358  Trial 
lawyers in North Carolina are now faced with the task of understanding 
the arguments for and against bifurcation on a deeper level than ever 
before.  Judges are faced with the task as well.  The impact of this new 
statute should not be underestimated. 
“[W]hen it is seen that the split trial reduces by more than half the 
cases in which personal injury plaintiffs are successful, it is apparent that 
bifurcation makes a substantial change in the nature of the jury trial 
itself.”359  Such a substantial change should entail careful and deliberate 
thought.  That kind of deliberation is missing in the passage of North 
Carolina’s law.  Indeed, if this change “is to be done, and if the 
Constitution permits it to be done, the change should come from those 
who are elected to make laws, with full awareness of what they are 
doing.”360  The North Carolina General Assembly has provided no 
evidence that it had full awareness of what it was doing.  To the 
contrary, it has proceeded to pass new laws in favor of bifurcation 
without addressing or analyzing the issues described above. 
To conclude, this Article respectfully disagrees with Professor 
Mayers and instead argues that a unitary proceeding is not 
“inherently . . . absurd.”361  Indeed, bifurcation in all cases, criminal and 
civil, is the exception rather than the rule.  As Professor Douglass 
persuasively argues in the criminal context, “[w]e cannot 
assume . . . that separation of trial and sentencing is part of the natural 
order of things.”362  Judges have shown some reluctance to bifurcate for 
their own reasons, but some of those reasons could include a respect for 
the problems described above.  That reluctance “perhaps reflects judicial 
concern about bifurcation’s impact on outcomes or heightened 
uneasiness about juror blindfolding.”363 
Life experience is replete with examples of unitary proceedings that 
may actually gain from separation.  A potential student may benefit from 
first determining where he should go to school and then evaluating how 
much it will cost.  An automobile purchaser may benefit from a similar 
 
 358. Weinstein, supra note 262, at 852. 
 359. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 201, § 2390. 
 360. Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. 
REV. 563, 570 (1967) (emphasis added). 
 361. See Mayers, supra note 1, at 389. 
 362. Douglass, supra note 71, at 1973. 
 363. Landsman et al., supra note 24, at 306. 
50
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol36/iss2/1
1._NELSON_FINAL_4.8.14_-_NEED_TO_PDF 4/9/2014  10:32 AM 
2014] JUDICIAL BIFURCATION 251 
analysis.  But there is also something to be said for gathering a complete 
picture and making a determination based on the totality of the 
circumstances.  Bifurcation, with all of its value, distorts that picture in 
the litigation context—for the parties, the judges, and the jury.  
Legislatures and courts, including those in North Carolina, should be 
aware of the distinct possibility of replacing “an exciting and gallant 
experiment in the conduct of serious human affairs”364 with the type of 
sterile laboratory discouraged by other courts.365 
 
 
 364. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1964). 
 365. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982) (discouraging 
the creation of “a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which causation is parted from the 
reality of injury”). 
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